

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Past and Present*

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The aim of "The Russian Review" is to present a non-partisan interpretation of Russian history, civilization, and culture. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article in this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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The Trojan Dove*

BY PETER VIERECK

I

SOVIET propaganda has taken as its symbol the dove of peace,¹ designed by Picasso. The Trojan dove has replaced the Trojan horse.

That the Soviet peace dove is Trojan in purpose, was admitted at a conference of Communist party officials at Limoges, October 1950, by the authoritative French Communist leader, Waldeck Rochet. The *Manchester Guardian*, November 14, 1950, reported his speech. The speech frankly stressed that the "peace" movement has as its purpose "the destruction of our enemies" and the "re-armament" of Russia, so that "the Soviet Union will choose the right moment" to start World War III:

You will say: "Why doesn't the Soviet Union intervene in Korea?" It would throw the Americans into the sea—that is true. But it would start a world war, which for the time being is contrary to the peace policy of the Soviet Union. . . . A year of peace is a year utilized to the utmost by the Soviet Union to reinforce its army and the armies of the popular democracies. It is to permit this rearmament, this development of the Soviet Union's strength, as well as the strength of the popular democracies, that we must actively continue our propaganda in favor of peace. It is this movement for peace that will undermine the imperialist armies and delay the outbreak of war [and] assure destruction of our enemies. *The Soviet Union will choose the right moment* and the imperialists will have no say in the matter.²

This speech cannot be brushed aside as unauthoritative or as not representing the official Soviet viewpoint. It has been reprinted in

*This article is a slightly abridged chapter from the author's forthcoming book, *Shame and Glory of the Intellectuals* which is to be published by the Beacon Press in February [Ed.]

¹Sometimes with peculiar results. In 1951 a fellow-traveler Indian magazine published the following effusion, a poem to the Soviet peace dove:

My Dove, after her bath of freedom
In Volga's streaming waters,
Carrying the pitcher of Peace
Betwixt rosy lips,
Sprinkles the twentieth century.

Needless to say, the sprinkling Soviet dove is rhapsodically contrasted with that warmonger of the bird family, the American eagle.

²Italics mine. *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, November 16, 1950, p. 15.

the Soviet press without denial from Waldeck Rochet or the French Communist party, and without Soviet disavowal.

The Moscow war pledge, falsely named "the Stockholm peace pledge," has been sufficiently exposed in America. Most Americans saw through its crude trick of trying to abolish solely the weapon in which America has a lead (the bomb) and not Russia's chief weapon (the Red Army). But owing to the usual failure of American peace propaganda, Moscow's "Stockholm" pledge has not been sufficiently discredited in Western Europe. There even prominent anti-Communists have been duped into joining the countless signatories. The anti-peace "peace"-lovers of the West would coax a Soviet Pearl Harbor against Paris or New York by ending our defensive alliances and armaments.

Ostrich isolationism prevents the peace it seeks. The right-wing isolationism of the Chicago *Tribune* and of the Europe-abandoning Asia Firsters is as suicidal as the left-wing isolationism of the fight-home-oppression-first liberals.

There are no more influential isolationists in America and England. But what we may call the "semis" are still influential: semi-isolationist, semi-interventionist. They do not yet see that our existence depends on recognizing the "Thirty Year War" of communism against America. The distinction between the semi-isolationists and the world-minded interventionists counts for more today than the anachronistic distinction between left and right. In foreign policy, what is the difference between such "semis" as the leftist socialist Bevan and the rightist capitalist Taft? Both would snip that seamless web of world-wide collective security which could have stopped Hitler peacefully in 1936 and which can yet save peace from the Soviet.

The stale charge of "imperialist expansion" is loosely used against the West today not merely by Marxists but by most confused liberals everywhere, especially in Asia. Who today is the big imperialist expander, Soviet Russia or the West? Let us familiarize ourselves thoroughly with the exact figures. Then Americans abroad will know how to answer European and Asiatic intellectuals, liberals and democratic socialists, who should all be, for their own survival, America's enthusiastic allies instead of baiters.

Here is the Soviet record as of 1952: territories annexed and satellites controlled, 13,151,700 sq. km., with a total population of 574,843,000 all conquered since 1939 by Communist imperialism.

While Soviet imperialism has been subverting and swallowing

country after country, the West has been liberating country after country and giving them economic and political aid. Since World War II, whether gladly or grudgingly, the West has peacefully relinquished rule over the same number of human beings as the number annexed by Soviet imperialism; namely, half a billion.

These are the newly independent countries—India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ceylon, Philippines, Burma, and Israel, covering an area of 6,576,700 sq. km., with a population of 545,400,000.

II

The enemy is not Russia nor any other particular ethnic group. The enemy is totalitarianism. Human rights are *absolute* for lovers of freedom. This holds true whether you base these rights on supernatural religious sanctions or on non-supernatural humanistic traditions. (The controversy within the human-rights camp, about whether these absolutes are supernaturally or naturally sanctioned, must not be allowed to divide us in the face of the Soviet threat to both sides.) Since human rights are absolute, and since the dignity of man is sacred to freedom lovers, it is utterly abhorrent to take so *relativistic* a position toward totalitarianism as "peaceful co-existence." Not in theory but in practice, peaceful coexistence with so dynamic an aggressor means a "big deal" with it, a super-Munich, to divvy the world's loot with it.

Suppose, for the sake of the argument, we accept this relativistic attitude toward Communist imperialism, which has conquered half a billion foreign peoples in a decade. Even then, we shall find peaceful coexistence pragmatically impossible. For totalitarianism means war. First of all, it means the certainty of an Iron Curtain cold war. Secondly, and in consequence, it means the possibility—very likely the probability—of hot war. No totalitarian police machine can afford the risk of peace. Peace means the risk of being overthrown by demands from below for a return to normalcy and decency. Totalitarianism needs foreign enemies, needs to change even former allies into enemies, in order to make its slaves put up with lack of freedom and lack of basic living standards. Because this war risk is innate in all communazi dynamism, peaceful coexistence with it is too risky an aim.

Like philosophical anarchists, pacifists are the salt of the earth. The presence of anyone with such stubborn—I almost said belligerent—integrity is a moral asset to our society, which needs to

encourage what little individualism it has left. Nor is our present defense effort impaired in the slightest by a group inherently so tiny and so non-conspiratorial as genuine pacifists. The rest of us have no right to suppress what, with them, is a matter of conscience. What we do have a right to ask of them is: join genuine pacifist groups, not front organizations infiltrated and subtly guided by peace-hating Communists, like the Hotel Waldorf "peace" conference of 1949. Let pacifists continue to be pacifists, and God bless them. But let them be open-eyed about it; let them not plunge blindly into "anti-war" without examining the credentials of their associates; let our good Quakers, in short, look before they quake.

Every Quaker ought to post the following warning over his desk. It is by a prominent pacifist minister on discovering he had been hoodwinked. The Reverend Donald Harrington of New York, when he withdrew as a sponsor of the Midcentury Conference for Peace, a Communist front, held in Chicago on May 29 and 30, 1950, made this public statement:

The stark fact is that the American Communist movement not only is willing to resort to any method or subterfuge to accomplish its purposes, but also it takes orders directly from Moscow and functions as an American arm of the Soviet Foreign Office. At this moment, though the international Communist movement is waging war, both cold and hot, and engaged in violence in many parts of the world, the American Communists have launched an exceedingly widespread and well-financed campaign for "peace."

The Communist Party line seems for a brief period to be running parallel with the point of view of pacifists and liberals. Communists, operating through a wide variety of "front" organizations, are seeking support of liberal and peace leaders and seeking to give them their support. They are not really interested in peace, but in appeasement. Their support will be turned to *sabotage* the moment it serves Soviet policy for this to occur.³

Well-meaners who have never in their lives read a Soviet newspaper or the text of any Soviet anti-cosmopolitan decree, are saying America could create a "peace atmosphere" by "conducting free discussions" between Soviet and Western intellectuals. Fine idea; but it takes two to discuss. Here is what the official Soviet party magazine, *Bolshevik*, No. 11, June, 1950, commands on this subject: "Soviet scientists do not conduct discussions with obscurantism, with the representatives of bourgeois pseudo-science, but expose them relentlessly and extirpate rotten bourgeois philosophy."

One scientist, the eminent physicist, Peter Kapitsa, of Cambridge University, went from the West on invitation into Russia to "con-

³Reverend Donald Harrington, quoted in *New York Times*, May 22, 1950, p. 19.

duct discussions" fraternally with Soviet colleagues—and was not allowed out again. His "rotteness" was speedily "extirpated" by the Soviet police. Siberia likewise awaits Soviet scientists who discuss with "rotten bourgeois" Western scientists: for example, the pitiful fate of the late N. I. Vavilov, who—after disagreeing with Lysenko's genetics and exchanging intellectual ideas with Westerners—suddenly disappeared to do what was tactfully reported as "research on Arctic problems."

Accompanied by wringing of hands, the escapist voices continue to plead, with an undoubtedly sincere whine: "Why cannot we somehow, by some new concession, some super-Yalta at the expense of those who trust us, or by some new direct conversation, improve Russian-American relations? Oh somehow, somehow!"

The answer continues to be: the Russian ruling class cannot risk improving relations, lest it lose the imaginary plotting enemy who keeps it in power. Suppose America did decide to become a People's Democracy under the Progressive party and destroyed every atom bomb and turned all Europe and half our resources over to Stalin. Not one word about our "pacific gesture" would appear in the censored Soviet press. The only result of such a gesture of good will and trust would be to make certain, instead of merely likely, a victorious Soviet Pearl Harbor against New York.

Yet if the Soviet rulers can never afford friendly foreign relations, they probably cannot afford war either. Whenever possible, they will seek their objectives by means short of a world war. Their aim, in which they have succeeded up to a point, is a middle stage that equally avoids peace and a major hot war. They will perpetrate a Pearl Harbor, as a matter of course, the instant they can do so without being themselves destroyed. But not before then, and that instant need never be reached; can be deterred by a free world both armed and united.

Our present international troubles might never have happened, or would have happened less seriously, had it not been for the key blunder, from which all else flowed. I refer, of course, to our unilateral evacuation of liberated Europe and our unilateral demobilization of 1945-46. It is not wrong in itself to disarm or to quit foreign shores; on the contrary; but it was wrong to do so unilaterally. "We didn't demobilize," said Bernard Baruch, commenting on 1945; "we scuttled and ran." On the fateful day of June 24, 1950, America had only ten and a half divisions all over the globe. The Soviet army had almost twenty times as many to draw on. Americans hate

militarism and almost unanimously crave peace. Our policy, therefore, must be collective pacifism. But it should not be unilateral pacifism, so long as Soviet policy is to pounce instantly upon the disarmed. The Soviet pounce upon Korea and upon its European neighbors shows that unilateral pacifism brings war.

The present costly and dangerous atomic race would have been entirely avoided by America's Baruch plan for atomic disarmament and inspection. This fair and workable plan was backed by almost all the countries of the world, including neutrals, except for the Soviet bloc. For propaganda purposes, Russia periodically offers atomic counterproposals; none is sincere or feasible because none allows a truly thorough atomic inspection.

It is no use hoping they ever will agree—except perhaps in vague lip service—to full inspection in the future. They cannot afford to. They cannot let the outside world see the truth of what is happening behind the Iron Curtain. The truth, as countless escapees have confirmed beyond cavil, is that Communist Russia is one big slum. It is a slum with an average of eight to ten people—two families—starving in each slummy room. Not in each apartment but in each room. This is the average; yet the American press was rightly shocked when it discovered cases, admittedly exceptional, of five in a room in the ghastly slums of Chicago. These horrors, which disgrace American culture, would seem paradise to the Soviet slaves. Can such a régime allow the outside world to see it freely? Not if it would survive.

Or can such a régime ever permit friendly relations with the West? Again the answer is no. Its survival depends on playing up "the capitalist menace" to its own people. The real rage of the Soviet rulers against America is that we were so friendly to it during and after the war. Lend-lease was in our interest; the war was still on. But even *after* Germany was defeated, we poured a quarter of a billion dollars of UNRRA into the Soviet Ukraine, saving it from certain starvation and permitting the rebuilding of this area of grain and of military industries. Even the Marshall Plan aid was offered to the Communist world; the Communists of Poland and Czechoslovakia were frantic to join it; only Stalin's veto prevented their joining that same Marshall Plan which they now pretend to regard as harmful to the European economy.

This shows that a friendly, normal relationship with the West is the one thing the Soviet government cannot afford, no matter what we offer. If a hostile world did not exist, Stalin would need to invent

it. No matter how many concessions we give them, no matter how many future UNRRA's and Lend-leases and Yaltas we shower upon them, even if we appease them with the rest of Asia and the rest of Europe, they will still need to create new war crises constantly for home consumption. Americans are Stalin's non-Aryans. He needs Wall Street as a scapegoat to hate and to blame for all home ills, for the same reason that Hitler needed the Jews for his own home propaganda.

This policy does not mean the Soviet leaders want an all-out world war. Such is presumably not their intention. They want not war but war crises, always just short of war. It means a continual playing with fire. One war crisis too many will get out of control, sooner or later. Such a blunder, rather than an outright immediate war wish, is what may cause World War III if we passively let things continue to drift. Peace formula: whatever leads to the overthrow of Russia's present dictatorship, leads to peace; whatever strengthens or appeases it or tolerates passive coexistence with it as "normal," is an automatic threat to peace.

III

Let Europe's and India's neutralists, who imagine they can remain as an independent "third solution," take warning from Stalin's essay on "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question":

The party of the proletariat decisively rejects what is known as "National Cultural Autonomy." When a life-and-death struggle is being waged, and is spreading, between proletarian Russia and the imperialist Entente, only two alternatives confront the border regions: either they join forces with Russia . . . or they join forces with the Entente. . . . There is *no third solution*. So-called independence of a so-called independent . . . Poland, Finland, etc., is only an illusion.⁴

Ah, but Lenin, at least Lenin, we are told, was "against war and imperialism." In order to get the most authoritative statement of the Soviet war policy, let us not listen to its propaganda "peace" drives; let us go to the top primary source of all, the works of Lenin himself. Here are his four basic war statements; and they are not being "taken out of context." Note his use of the words "holy" and "inevitable" to describe the war against the non-Soviet world. (Italics mine.)

⁴New York, International Publishers, p. 79.

If war is waged by the exploiting class with the object of strengthening its class rule, such a war is a criminal war, and "defencism" in such a war is a base betrayal of socialism. If war is waged by the proletariat after it has conquered the bourgeoisie in its own country, and is waged with the object of strengthening and extending socialism, such a war is legitimate and "holy."⁶

We are living not merely in a state, but in a *system of states*, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of *frightful collisions* between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be *inevitable*.⁷

*As soon as we are strong enough to defeat capitalism as a whole, we shall immediately take it by the scruff of the neck.*⁷

As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace: in the end, *one or the other* will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism.⁸

Let nobody repeat unchallenged the stale half-truth that the battle between Russia and the West is one of ideologies only, or else one of economic systems, but not one of military force. According to this illusion, there is no battlefield involved; the differences can be settled in a big debating hall, with the best debater winning. That might suit our parliamentary tradition, but it is utterly ruled out both by the theory and practice of Communism. This was shown by direct quotations from Lenin and Stalin, staking the issue not on ideological debate but on what they call an "inevitable" and "holy" war. Their conquest of half a billion people proves that here at least they practice what they preach. Our main enemy is not the Communist ideology nor their "socialist" economics, but the Red army, the Red air force, the Red spies and saboteurs.

A non-risky foreign policy is impossible in a world where freedom must either "live dangerously" or not at all. Also risky, but less risky than either appeasement or war, would be a Western foreign policy of liberating the East.

For the millions of slaves behind the Iron Curtain, "peaceful" coexistence means not peace but a continuation of torture and murder. For them, such coexistence between governments is not a "lesser evil" than war, but indistinguishable from war. According to the most convincing estimate,⁹ nine million Soviet citizens—

⁶Lenin, *Selected Works*, Moscow, official English translation issued by Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, VII, 357.

⁷Ibid., Vol. VIII, 33.

⁸Ibid., Vol. VIII, 282.

⁹Ibid., Vol. VIII, 297.

¹⁰Alexander Weissberg, *The Accused*, New York, 1952.

5.5 per cent of the country—were arrested, deported, or killed during the political purge of 1936-39 against alleged Trotskyites.

Prior to that and even grimmer was the economic purge against free peasants and alleged kulaks during Stalin's collective-farm program. Numerically this was the most murderous single peacetime crime in all history. According to several different and independent accounts of reliable ex-officials of Soviet collectivization, between five and ten million peasants were *deliberately* starved to death. At least an equal number of peasants were worked to death in forced labor camps. During all this time, Soviet Russia was "coexisting" with the West. This is the warlike hell which Western peace policies toward the Soviet dictator have inflicted upon Soviet citizens, ever since the abandonment of our much too inadequate intervention of 1918. To denounce the Churchill-sponsored intervention of 1918 as imperialism instead of hailing it as an attempt to liberate our Russian allies of World War I, is still another of the parrot-clichés of liberal intellectuals.

In its peacetime political and economic purges, the Kremlin dictatorship has murdered in cold blood a larger number of Soviet citizens than the number of Red Army soldiers (about seven million) killed by the cruel Nazi invasion in World War II. Add to this the Katyn massacre of Polish officers, the genocide against the three Baltic states, the postwar liquidation of the Crimean Tartars and Volga Germans, and the current liquidation in labor camps of the Jewish population of Hungary and of Russian border areas. Such a Soviet "peace" is indistinguishable from a foreign war for its victims. No wonder millions of Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians hope for a liberating foreign war—mistakenly, from our own anti-war viewpoint—in preference to the endless murders and tortures of a Soviet "peace."

Heartless indeed (or at best ignorant) are those who praise such a Soviet "peace" as a goal. Heartless are those who prefer "containment" to liberation.¹⁰

The Quakers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not compromise their opposition to southern slavery. They bluntly called it an evil. They refused to regard "coexisting" with it as peace. What a shock and disappointment, therefore, to read the wildly-hailed Quaker "peace" plan of 1949. It advocates appease-

¹⁰In connection with our policy toward Soviet-occupied nations, American officials should read the article, "Beyond Containment to Liberation," *Commentary*, September, 1951, by the able Yugoslav political analyst, Professor Bogdan Raditsa.

ment and coexistence and concessions for the far worse slavery of Stalin. It rejects, as fomenters of bad Russo-American relations, those who would expose, denounce, and terminate this Soviet war against its own Russian people. It warns against the "temptation" of "promoting the overthrow of the Soviet régime," even though Quakers had never hesitated to work for the "overthrow" of American slavery. It warns America against "proposing in the UN measures sharply divisive in effect" (the proposals for investigating Soviet slave labor), even though Christian ethics itself is "divisive" from evil and even though the Quakers rightly felt "divisive" against Hitler's slave camps.

If Quakers are still Christians, if they still prefer human rights to slavery, if they still seek to prevent World War III instead of causing it by substituting appeasement for liberation, then their next "report" will be an indictment of Soviet slave camps. As an admirer of their great past and of their pacifist objectives, I hope we shall not have to wait too long for such a report. I hope it will point out that the very existence, or "coexistence," of the Soviet dictatorship is a perpetual aggressive war, with more Russian victims than World War II.

It is time for sincere pacifists to abandon "coexistence" and to work for peace by working for the political weakening and eventual overthrow of the Soviet terror. I say this not out of any reactionary or militarist mockery of Christian pacifism. I say it out of bitter sorrow because this celebrated "peace report" is such a mockery of the Sermon on the Mount, such a mockery of peace, such a betrayal of the Quaker anti-slavery crusade of the nineteenth century. The goal of the West should be no tough-minded cynical militarism but the peace-loving decencies of civilization. The route to this goal is still the Biblical one of liberation. Liberation from the dictatorship of the Big Lie: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

IV

Fortunately, America's alternatives are neither Scylla nor Charybdis. Scylla would be: an insane preventive war against Russia. This might unite the Russian people against us and destroy both our nations. Charybdis would be: to buy "peaceful coexistence" from the Soviet leaders by callously ignoring the suffering Soviet peoples and by paying the ever-increasing blackmail of surrendering our last defenses in Europe, Asia, and South America.

The third alternative: avoid military war by aiming at the political weakening (overthrow may be too optimistic at present) of the Communist dictatorship and the political wooing of the Russian people. We must recall to them their own free Duma tradition of 1905-17. We must evoke their own nineteenth-century prophets of freedom and their more individualistic, less statist days of ancient Kiev. Since freedom grows organically in its native soil and cannot be transplanted in "liberal" fashion, this approach seems wiser than schoolmasterishly telling them to adopt our foreign democratic constitution wholesale. We must never bluster provocatively or chauvinistically.

This misery of the proletarians behind the Iron Curtain caused several million during the past decade to risk lives and families in order to desert. From the land of proletarian dictatorship they fled to the lands of democratic capitalism or of social democracy. In 1952, despite death penalties, reprisals against families, and electrically-charged barbed wire, 20,000 a month are still fleeing westward from East Germany alone, and at least 1,600 monthly from the adjoining Iron Curtain countries.¹¹

What is the West doing about this? Almost nothing. What can it do about the suffering working classes of the East? Almost everything, for we have hardly begun to try. The Soviet is spending 1.5 billion dollars¹² a year for revolutionary activities abroad, trying to turn non-Soviet workers against their governments. By the close of 1951, the United States for the first time voted funds for counteraction. But only 100 million dollars. Without attempting to equal the vast Soviet figure of 1.5 billions (15 times our own), why not spend at least an effectively large sum on wooing the Soviet workers and peasants? It may save us the same sum many times over in military expense. More important: it alone can still save the human race from World War III.

This all-out wooing of the Iron Curtain peoples may make the Soviet leaders too unsure of their Red Army to embark on large-scale foreign invasions. The Kremlin never will forget, and we ought not to forget, that the invading German armies of 1941 were greeted with cheers and flowers. Only because they soon revealed themselves as merely a brown-shirted version of Bolshevik oppression, did the Russian peoples wage their brave "fatherland war" against

¹¹New York *Herald Tribune*, January 9, 1952; editorial page, "Freedom's Two Faces."

¹²New York *Herald Tribune*, January 30, 1952, page 13, columns 2-3.

Germany. They fought Germany not for Communism but despite Communism.

The Kremlin never will forget, and we ought not to forget, what happened among officials in Moscow in October, 1941. Moscow seemed about to fall. High officials were ordered to transfer to Kuibyshev. At this point, the secret police, the very pillar of the régime, broke down. It burnt its own files, while many Party officials fled to remote spots of Russia, along with Party funds.

Many able authorities call it hopeless to woo the Russian masses politically. Difficult certainly: the secret police are in full control; talk of anti-Soviet guerilla bands is at present a romantic exaggeration (although in case we are attacked, we ought to drop guns and commandos over slave-labor camps and over disaffected minorities). Yet even today, political wooing of the Russian people is not hopelessly hopeless. This is shown by the external desertions from Russia today and the internal desertions in Moscow in 1941. After a year of intimate experience with Russians, General Richard Hilton declared (*italics his*): "Among the vast non-official masses, there is absolutely *no* crusading zeal for the spread of Communism over the world, *no* xenophobia, *no* genuine belief that foreigners of any kind are plotting dark deeds against Russia, and *no* desire whatever for another war."

V

Too bad there is no truth in the adage that "it takes two to make a fight." It takes only one if the one is insatiable. The Communist aim continues to be world conquest. They say so in their theories (read them!). They behave so in their practice (list the countries conquered!). Optimists who hopefully quote Lenin's repudiation of "imperialist war," fail to quote his equally firm approval of "progressive war." The distinction between "imperialist" and "progressive" would be defined by Stalin, not by American Quakers. Therefore, "progressive war" may be defined as any aggression the Kremlin chooses to wage, and "imperialist war" would be any defense made by the West. Any treacherous Pearl Harbor against America would be justified as "progressive" both by Leninist theory and by Stalinist practice.

All the more reason for reaching the Russian people. We must plan new means to reach that vast majority who lack short-wave radio sets. The use of wind-borne balloons by "Crusade for Freedom," bearing gifts and messages, seems effective. It is helped by

a symbolic coincidence of meteorology: the winds of Europe blow mainly from the free West to the East, not vice versa. It is merely one of many methods of piercing the Iron Curtain which Yankee ingenuity will have to devise. All this will involve changes in our foreign policy and our broadcasts. We must start treating the thousands of monthly deserters from the Iron Curtain as cherished allies, not as unwanted D.P.'s. We must let them broadcast, as Russians to Russians. More conviction-carrying than our American voices will be these Russian voices to their countrymen, telling them of American friendship and good treatment and debunking the lies about our "capitalist oppression" or our "plots" to bomb Russia.

Since the Soviet dictatorship rejects the Baruch plan and all enforceable disarmament plans, peace still depends on the collective security of the Atlantic Pact. The headquarters of the Atlantic Pact in France (SHAPE) is one of the most fervently peace-dedicated, war-loathing atmospheres that can be found anywhere in the world today. The American statement at SHAPE in late 1951 made this crystal-clear: "We seek only to deter the Russians from some act of aggression, which could ignite the world before we have time to find the road to peace."

Nothing can be gained at the moment from disarmament conferences, aside from the propaganda gains of both sides trying to put the blame on the other for the *inevitable* failure of all such conferences. Inevitable because disarmament and a stable peace require an end of the Iron Curtain, which Russia has no intention of ending. What is gained by making a scapegoat of armaments? They are an effect, not a cause. It is not armaments that are creating the war danger. It is the war danger that is creating more armaments. The chief war danger, which must be removed before armaments can be removed, is the Soviet dictatorship itself.

Alexander Blok

BY HELEN MUCHNIC

ALEXANDER BLOK was born on November 28, 1880, two months before Dostoevsky's death, and his first volume of poems was published in 1904, the year Chekhov died. He himself lived for forty-one years, until 1921, so that his life spans almost exactly the period of revolutionary transition from Tsarist to Bolshevik Russia. His first poems were lyrics that recorded the intimate dreams of a highly emotional and introspective poet, but he ended with work written about and for his country rather than about and for himself; and "The Twelve," for which he is most famous, has been called *the poem of the Revolution*. His was a social conscience that warred with a temperament inclined to solitude, and both his triumph as a poet and his tragedy as a man are the outcome of this war.

Numerous accounts of Blok as a person produce, in various ways, the impression of a man intent upon his thought, absorbed in his private vision, and yet neither self-centered nor eccentric, somehow combining almost statuesque aloofness with kindly awareness of and interest in others—a man who, in a curious way, is both solitary and in touch with people, who can talk to them enchantingly and of them in a way they recognize as true, although he cannot speak with them, who is indifferent to praise or blame, but glad to be understood. His is a solitude of a very different order from the irremediable isolation of the "poètes maudits," without the bitterness of Rimbaud, the scorn of Baudelaire, the sought-out despair of Valéry, the melancholy submissiveness of Verlaine,—while on the other hand, his concern with human beings is neither the preacher's, nor the scientist's, nor the reformer's, neither Tolstoy's, nor Chekhov's, nor Gorky's. He is a poet, and therefore alone, but he suffers from this isolation and overcomes it in successive stages. In his earliest lyrics, he writes of highly individual experience but already in such a way that whoever is familiar with the cult of the Virgin or with fairy-tales, or has some understanding of the *Ewig Weibliche*, has an inkling of what his esoteric visions are about. Later, his theory of art explains the poet as a kind of mediator between earth and heaven, a kind of seer whose visions rise out of the ground to take shape in the skies.

He had no desire for popularity, but neither had he any patience

with "pure aestheticism," and frequently expressed such sentiments as the following:

I fear every manifestation of the tendency of "art for art's sake," because such tendencies contradict the very essence of art and because in following it we would, ultimately, lose art. For it is born of the eternal interaction of two strains of music—the music of the creative individuality and the music which sounds in the depths of the people's soul, the soul of the *masses*. Great art is born only of the union of these two electric currents. . . .

And so, although his poems, like those of other Symbolists, are allusive, mysterious, evocative, although they make use of private imagery, and convey the indeterminate meanings of music rather than the precise ones of logic, the "dead poets, his ancestors" who "assert their immortality" in his lines are the readily understandable Pushkin, Gogol, and Dostoevsky, rather than the "difficult" Baudelaire, Verlaine, or Mallarmé. Not method so much as aesthetic purpose and moral conviction distinguish him from the masters of French and English Symbolism. Unlike Baudelaire, he was not driven by a desire to escape banality and shock the Philistine; unlike Verlaine, he was not absorbed in sensations; unlike Mallarmé, he was neither charmed by obscurity nor the urge to express non-existence. And Pater's famous phrase, "not the fruit of experience, but experience itself is the end" could not have been his credo. It was neither experience nor its fruits that he was after, but Truth, some permanent, eternal value that might lend meaning to experience. Obscurity seemed to him a mark of vanity or of poetic deficiency, as he says in one of his early poems, drawing a distinction between the laureled "singer" of strange songs who delights in misty verse, and "the poet" whose goal is Truth, and whose reward is not a laurel wreath, but the glimpse of unknown light beyond new horizons. But the fundamental difference between Blok and other modern Symbolists is this, that whereas their perception was based on a sense of irreconcilable dualities: "the absolute laws of the mind and the limiting contingencies of life" for Valéry; existence and non-existence for Mallarmé; Earth and the Beyond for Yeats, Blok's derived from an innate sense of wholeness, a feeling for a unifying principle that he called "music."

In the beginning was music. Music is the world's essence. . . . Culture is the musical rhythm [through which the world grows]. The whole brief history of man, that has remained in our poor memory, is, it would seem, the alternation of epochs—in one of which music dies down, sounds muffled, to gush forth with wilful pressure in the one that follows it next.

So he wrote in his diary in 1919, and developed this theme in *The Decline of Humanism*, making explicit what all his work had said by implication, emphasizing, as Tolstoy had done in a different way, the reality of the unanalyzable substratum of existence, the matrix of life and the motion of the universe which man's mind cannot grasp, although his whole being is intuitively aware of it.

Blok's attention was centered primarily on the "music" of his emotions, and in his work he found concrete visual equivalents and rhythms to express it. If genuine lyricism is a translation of initial, recondite experience that has no language of its own, Blok's initial experience is the powerful and undirected flux and reflux of emotion, that seems limitless in strength, depth, and duration, principally because it is in essence, aimless and larger than its cause. "Every human feeling," Coleridge wrote, "is greater and larger than the existing cause . . . and this is deeply implied in music, in which there is always something more and beyond the immediate expression!" Blok knew this, though he did not, and never could have explained it in Coleridge's terse and brilliant way. Instead, he conveyed his sense of it dramatically, as it were, in imagery and sound. Like Mallarmé, and other Symbolist poets, he sought to transmit that which was "hardly expressible," but unlike the others, he did not see the "hardly expressible" as the fleeting and the momentary, but on the contrary, as the universal and enduring. Music and imagery were to him something other than a means of suggestion or evocation. He had no such theory as Mallarmé's that poetry must never *paint* but only *allude* to objects and that its proper dominion was not creation or statement but the unveiling of the interconnections between aspects of things. And if his poetry is also a study in relations there is this difference between it and that of the French Symbolists: that the end of this study Blok conceived to be not an understanding of interconnections, but a metaphysical insight that such understanding could yield. What gave him joy was not the pattern itself of relations, but knowledge of what lay back of them, meaning rather than emotion, insight rather than pleasure. He believed in the reality of the imperceptible and the unattainable, and the significance of his life lay in his quest of this; but, unlike Valéry, he was not afraid to realize a dream lest the delight of dreaming vanish, and unlike Mallarmé, he had no desire to express the existence of non-existence. Mallarmé's theory was the product of an analytic turn of mind of a kind that was distasteful to Blok, whose whole bent was away from the questioning, the skeptical, the

rational—which accounts for the immediate, dramatic quality of his lyrics and the clear-cut lucidity of his images that have nothing of the intermelting mobility of Mallarmé's. For Blok did not value indefiniteness, and the effect of melting and fusing in his poetry is not designed,—not even in "The Snow Mask,"—to emphasize imprecision but to create an impression of exactitude, just as the frequent extravagance of his imagery does not seem rhetorical but merely appropriate to the turbulence it symbolizes. His method was direct rather than allusive; his whole attitude tended toward affirmation rather than denial, and the symbols in which he wrote were the expression not of aesthetic theory but of a kind of habit of soul, an emotional and intellectual predisposition to see disparate elements as units. Thus, the essence of life *was* music to him, not *like* music; his bride not *like* the Beautiful Lady but, actually, her earthly aspect; an Enchantress was Fate, or a shooting star.

Blok was never consumed as Valéry had been, for example, with the "mad desire to understand." The mad desire that consumed him was to attain that which without any effort of thought, he somehow knew existed, and if Valéry, in the words of Marcel Raymond, sang "a hymn of gratitude to the forces which are active only in the shadow," Blok extolled forces of mystery that were revealed to him in a blinding light. There is something primitive in his sense of the fusion of the natural and the supernatural, in the way the hardest actualities of earth are to him translucent, as if permeated by the light from the realm of the Beautiful Lady. And this makes for an interesting difference between him and Yeats, whom in some ways he resembles. A mere glimpse of the Beyond makes Yeats miserable and restless on earth: "Come away, O human child!" he calls to man to escape with him to the Fairyland of imagination, away from the sad earth, which is "more full of weeping than you can understand." But Blok stays down below, where visions illuminate life and make it bearable. It is not the sorrow of the world but the idea of God that seems to him incomprehensible; tragedy, to him, is not the suffering of man, but the failure of his soul or spirit; and so he searches and yearns for that which Yeats seems never to have lost.

The cadences and images of Blok's poetry are an intimate revelation not only of this fundamentally non-analytical, affirmative quality of his nature, but of the very traits of temperament that must have shaped it, the pattern itself of his personality that, through varied modulations, displays a fundamental consistency from the beginning to the end, from the "Verses about the Beautiful

Lady" to "The Scythians." All through, like the tempests of his poems blowing over an indestructible land, the forces of passion and of enduring calm weave the basic design of his life and of his poetry: the onward rush and circular return in the rhyme scheme of his early lyrics; the mounting waves of struggle that fall from crest to trough in the poems of 1907; the moments of infatuation, with Faina, Carmen, and the Revolution, followed by periods of dejection; and always, throughout the tension and the lassitude, the devotion to Russia, to the Beautiful Lady and to Lyubov Dmitrevna, always to the raging variations, the counterpoise of lasting quietness as intense as the moments of passion. These were, perhaps, manifestations of the antagonistic elements of character that he had inherited, the daemonic violence of the Bloks and the quiet dignity of the Bektovs, and it was this that doubtless made it possible for him to see "a pair of wings behind the shoulders of every Red guardsman."

His poetry reconciled the antagonisms of his nature, and its imagery is as organic as its rhythms—the visual counterpart of the musical ebb and flow that unites the romantic and realistic aspects of his vision, as his cadences combined violence and calm. Thus, the shrines and trappings of chivalric romance, that stand for desires beyond those life can satisfy, occur along the roads of a familiar landscape; the fires and abysses of wildest romanticism, that symbolize mad passions, flame and yawn on city streets; the ships of thought come sailing into imaginable harbors; the bewitching Stranger retains her mystery in ordinary places; Christ leads men through an actual blizzard in a real city; and the wide circles described by a hawk in the sky are the same as circles made in time by succeeding generations, as well as the play of muscles on a wrestler's back and the flight of airplanes that marks the emergence of an historic epoch. And so close were the instruments of poetry to his very modes of thought and feeling that Blok could sense them as the very language of historic periods. Who but he—as in his choice of the *iamb* for *Retribution*—would have perceived the pulsations of a poetic metre to be the rhythm of an epoch?

It is also the element of reconciliation, this process of greater and greater inclusiveness that makes for an essential difference between Blok and such a Symbolist as Baudelaire, of whom denial and rejection are more characteristic than affirmation. Blok's love was never tinged with blasphemy, not even when the Beautiful Lady had "changed her aspect" and appeared to him behind a mask of evil.

He too was acquainted with damnation but was never so completely damned as Baudelaire, and his happiness was as profound and mysterious as Baudelaire's despair. Nature for Baudelaire was a monstrous compensation for what he had desired and been denied, a giantess of primal lusts, the form of his revenge for the tenderness and care he had not had. And in his celebrated temple of correspondences, where Nature surrounds a man in a forest of symbols, it is the symbols of corruption that are boundless, expansive, ecstatic, while those of innocence are limited and concrete. But Blok's Nature is an infinite extension of what he knows and loves, and evil is limitation, a sin against this infinite. That is why he loves all that soars and flies, and accepts the Revolution because it is "winged." "Here is something else I have understood," he writes on January 18, 1918, "this workers' side of Bolshevism, which is with the flying, the winged. This is where they need help. The people have wings, one must help them in skills and knowledge." This is why also the history of Blok's poetry, as that of his spiritual development, is the story of an ever-widening circle from an inward world to broader spheres. Probably he would have subscribed to Jean Cocteau's description of the poetic state as comparable to that when, in "great grief" or "great weariness" one dozes without sleeping, and associations take place, "which are neither associations of ideas nor of images nor memories. Rather, they are monsters that meet, secrets that emerge into the light, a whole equivocal and enigmatic world," but the special monsters and secrets that attended Blok seemed more and more to clarify and simplify his "equivocal and enigmatic world," giving his private nightmares the character of public demonstrations.

He has often been called a mystic and a prophet, but it seems to me that he was not a mystic at all. Although he longed for transcendent vision, his glimpses into the Beyond were fitful and troubled, with nothing of the true mystic's certitude, and what he saw there was so clearly analogous to his earthly experience that one cannot call it revelation. There was nothing in his life to make him believe in mysterious forces operating on him and through him, manifesting themselves by means of spiritual mediums or in telepathy. His visions were his own, not to be shared or communicated, except insofar as he himself willed that they should be through his poetry. He had no experience of an *Anima Mundi* or a Collective Unconscious. And his poetry is hardly the poetry of trance and but rarely the product of "unconscious cerebration" on the order of

"Kublai Khan." It is the result, rather, of ardent introspection and the skill to reproduce the secret motions of deep inwardness in language that does justice to their complex rhythms, colors, forms. It is as if Plato's scheme had been modified to make man's inmost consciousness the first step of the creative process, from which, as the second step, ideal forms might be derived, then to be copied by the artist in the third step,—with ultimate reality, therefore, not the universal, archetypal patterns, but the intimate and individual event, a kind of characteristically Russian "Platonic realism."

Of course, in discussions of Symbolism the central question is always the relation of appearance to reality, with the implication that appearance is commonplace and universally perceptible, and reality recondite, hard to come by and to be expressed only through analogy. "To reveal in a flash, to make sensible to the heart, the occult reality which the veil of appearance, normal perceptions, easily definable feeling, clear ideas, conceals from us," that, says Marcel Raymond, for example, is the nature of symbolist imagery. To Blok the perceptible and the occult seemed equally real, important, and complex; and his whole life represents a search for meanings through which the reality of both might be expressed. It is not easy, it is perhaps impossible to tell whether a given image in a poem of his had begun with a vision or a physical perception; and if, as Edmund Wilson has said, "the symbols of the Symbolists are metaphors detached from their subjects," in Blok's case one does not always know what is subject and what metaphor, whether it is the physical perception that should be taken as the event and the vision as its symbol, or the other way round. Dreaming and waking were interchangeable in his experience; he passed so easily, so imperceptibly from the one to the other that one might say of him either that he was always waking, or always dreaming; never does he seem more lucid than when he writes of nebulous and troubled states, and never more mysterious than when he speaks of what seems perfectly ordinary. Nor is there anything mysterious or miraculous in the way in which some of his poems seem to foretell the future. In their "prophetic" aspect they are really statements of desires or fears that were fulfilled in his life. For little of importance happened to Blok through chance alone, and if his life seemed sometimes to have imitated art, it was only proof that his desires as poet were urgent and his will as man was strong.

Rationalistic discussion of what mattered, however, seemed blasphemous to him—and although he did not argue in terms of

"the dualism of mind and matter," of the difference between life itself and ideas about life, such distinctions were the very atmosphere in which his highly individual perceptions developed. Blok might have said of the mystic philosophy of Vladimir Soloviov what Coleridge had said of those mystics whose writings had influenced him:

. . . the writings of these mystics acted in no slight degree to prevent my mind from being imprisoned within the outline of any single dogmatic system. They contributed to keep alive the *heart* in the *head*; gave me an indistinct, yet stirring presentiment, that all the products of the mere *reflective* faculty partook of *Death*. . . .

Not "intellectualism" alone, but all hard and fast formulations of belief, all creeds repelled him. And he was perhaps most right about himself when, in a remarkably revealing letter to Biely in 1907, he wrote:

You have wanted and still want to know, my "moral, philosophical, religious physiognomy." I do not know, literally cannot reveal it to you without showing it in relation to the events of my life, to my experience. Some of these events and experiences *nobody in the world knows about*. . . .

I have no *philosophic credo*, because I am not versed in philosophy; I do not believe in God and I dare not believe, because is it to believe in God to have depressing, lyrical, meager notions of him? I had rather say, so you might understand me better, that I believe, *most particularly*, in myself, that I sense in myself a kind of healthy integrity and the ability to be a *man*,—free, independent and honest. *All this I have experienced and bear inside of me.* . . . And here is one of my psychological peculiarities: *I prefer people to ideas.* . . .

Like his "Twelve," Blok himself was "without a Cross," wandering through snow and darkness in pursuit of a wavering light. But, perhaps, it was the blizzard itself that was his goal, and his life a demonstration of Goethe's principle of eternal striving. There is, indeed, something curiously Faustian in the pattern of his life: his absorption in himself, his quest of "the inmost force which binds the world," his emotional involvements, his "social service,"—a pattern that, with certain modifications, is true also of Yeats. But Beauty and Peace were the objects of Yeats's desire, Passion was the aim of Blok's,—passion, *i.e.*, as that which is elemental, boundless, and is the antithesis of pettiness and apathy. Music, unlike reasoning, set no bounds to knowledge, did not enclose itself with protective screens against a limitless world of storms, heavens, and abysses. There was a realm of Fate grander than that of comfortable homes and well-tended gardens; there was misery in loves

that could be reckoned; and a brutal, violent revolution was better than clever talk about principles behind closed doors and shuttered windows. The Revolution meant to him the sweeping away of all the triviality and dullness of the reactionary years that had preceded it, their "abominable desolation . . . insane boredom and senseless idleness"; it was a torrent that had "roared" in 1905 and had "disappeared into the earth" and was now "stirring again," with the noise of "a new music," so that "our lying, dirty, boring, monstrous life" might become "a just and clean, a gay and beautiful life." In Blok's impassioned rhetoric and his denunciation of the trivial, one is reminded of Gogol and of Dostoevsky. Like his great predecessors, he saw "largeness" of moral intention as peculiarly Russian, but unlike them,—for he lived in an age of reappraisals—he could not be certain that the religion of the past embodied this ideal adequately. The Vision was here in the whirling columns of snow. But what was this Vision? Provisionally, it had to be Christ. The terror of the infinite frightened him as it had frightened Pascal, but he was exhilarated by it, too, and there was no question for him of a possible wager with Destiny, no playing safe for the sake of comfort through eternity. Blok plunged into the destructive element, sought out chaos and tempests, and sacrificed love for Love. "That which the most 'healthy' among us call 'life,'" he said, "is only *gossip about life* . . . the world's morality is bottomless and does not resemble that which is so called. The world is moved by music, passion, partisanship, strength." It is not self-indulgence that drove Blok to the "abyss" and the "whirlwinds," but the necessity to be at one with "life," close to the heart of "reality," which he saw as a moral principle that set the world in motion. And it was in this spirit, with the tragic blindness of his Poet in "The King in the Square" and the devotion of his Bertrand in "The Rose and the Cross," that he threw himself into the Revolution.

The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Comintern, 1933-1935*

BY ROBERT P. BROWDER

I

THE inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, on March 4, 1933, marked the beginning of a gradual change in the attitude of Washington toward the Soviet Union—a change that reached its consummation with the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, on November 16, 1933, after sixteen years of non-recognition. President Roosevelt and his advisers, prompted largely by general considerations of world peace, and unable to find any justification for the continued silence between two great powers whose acts must perforce play such a paramount rôle in international affairs, acted to correct what they considered a diplomatic anachronism.¹ But they were equally convinced that the successful conclusion of any negotiations with Moscow depended upon the resolution of certain longstanding barriers to friendly official intercourse. These included the problem of debts, religious and legal rights for Americans in Russia—and the interference, through the American Communist Party, of the Moscow-directed Third International in the internal affairs of the United States.

The record of Moscow in relation to the latter issue was scarcely reassuring. Since the foundation of the Comintern in 1919, Communist parties in every country of the world had systematically planned and labored to bring about the desired revolution in their national bailiwicks. Their connection with the parent organization was hardly questioned. But by means of a smoke screen of half-truths and legalistic evasions the USSR obscured its relationship to

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¹Interview with former Under Secretary of State William Phillips, Boston, Massachusetts, June 7, 1949. Hereafter cited as Phillips Interview. Letter to the author from former Ambassador to Russia William C. Bullitt, February 2, 1950. See also, Henry Morgenthau Jr., "The Morgenthau Diaries," Part III, *Colliers*, October 11, 1947, p. 20; and Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, New York, 1948, v. 1, pp. 292-293, 304.

the International sufficiently to assure the continuance of diplomatic relations with other governments. The fiction of non-connection between the two entities was believed by no one, but for many nations it was more convenient to accept the explanation than to endanger commercial and political relations with the Soviet Union. On occasion, the Communists' blatant disregard for even the ground rules of gentlemanly understanding between Russia and other countries had led to diplomatic breaks. The most sensational example was the notorious Zinoviev letter and the subsequent rupture of Soviet relations with Great Britain in 1927. Opinion in the United States was almost unanimous on the necessity of providing against the occurrence of such incidents in any future contact with Soviet Russia.

President Roosevelt and his associates were well aware of the feeling on this issue and cognizant of the fact that any agreement must contain careful guarantees against Soviet-inspired subversive activity in America.² In a memorandum on the question of recognition, written in September for the President by Robert F. Kelley, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs for the Department of State, the Russian expert counselled the negotiation of an iron clad agreement previous to recognition. In his opinion, it was essential for friendly relations that the USSR sever all ties with Communism in the United States.³ Secretary Hull seconded this view in his memorandum to the President, as did Assistant Secretary of State R. Walton Moore and the Special Assistant to Hull, William C. Bullitt.⁴

Thus, when the President announced on October 20 that he had invited the Soviet government to send a representative to Washington to discuss the issues outstanding between the two countries and that he had received an acceptance, naming Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov as the envoy, the experts in the State Department were already working on a propaganda agreement which would satisfy American requirements and, at the same time, be acceptable to Litvinov and his government. All relevant treaties between the Soviet Union and other nations were being carefully examined for possible borrowings and to ascertain the limits to

²*Ibid.*, p. 300; Phillips Interview; interview with Mr. Robert F. Kelley, Washington, D. C., June 15, 1949. Hereafter cited as Kelley Interview.

³*Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers*, 1933, v. 2, Washington, D. C., 1950, pp. 782-788. This series hereafter cited as *Foreign Relations*.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 789-794.

which Moscow had gone in the past in the direction of concessions on this vital point.⁵

The first conversations between the Soviet envoy and the American negotiators took place in Washington at the State Department on November 8, 1933.⁶ Together with Under Secretary Phillips, Moore, Bullitt, Kelley, and Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, Secretary Hull discussed with Litvinov the guarantees which the United States government expected on propaganda, and on religious rights and legal prerogatives for American citizens in Russia. But on none of these points was the Commissar prepared to agree to the drafts already drawn up by the Department. The proposed articles on propaganda and illegal activity had been written with particular care by Kelley—with such great care, in fact, that Litvinov found them entirely unacceptable.

Intentionally, Kelley and his associates had omitted any mention of the Third International as such and avoided the word "Communism." On both scores, later critics of the pledge accused the drafters of negligence. But the American officials had reasoned that if the organization was referred to specifically it would be an easy matter for the Reds to change the name and thus violate the spirit but not the letter of the agreement. Furthermore, the American negotiators were ready for the objections of Litvinov. The wording of the document, they pointed out to the envoy, was taken from various other treaties signed by the Soviet Union. Somewhat disconcerted by that information, the Commissar asked for time to study the matter more carefully.⁷

However, the meetings of the second day found Litvinov still adamant. Accordingly, Secretary Hull was forced to report to the President that the negotiations had reached an early impasse. Both Hull and Phillips suspected that part of the trouble lay in the desire of the Commissar, for purposes of prestige, to deal directly with Roosevelt. The only answer, if an agreement was to be achieved, lay in transferring the talks to the White House. The President agreed to undertake the task and Secretary Hull arranged to bring Litvinov to see him on the following day.

⁵Hull, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-299.

⁶Phillips Interview. The following account of the first three days of the negotiations is based largely upon the diary of Mr. Phillips, which was read to the author during the interview. The official account of the conversations and resulting agreements may be found in *Foreign Relations, 1933*, v. 2, pp. 802-814.

⁷Kelley Interview; Hull, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-301.

Consequently, around noon, on November 10, Hull, Phillips, and possibly Bullitt escorted the envoy to the President's study. The conference, which lasted about an hour, began with Roosevelt reviewing the problems under consideration and the course of the discussions to date. In his most affable and winning manner, the President drew the threads of the negotiation together, expressed the sincere interest of the United States in a just settlement, and, to break the ice, injected a measure of humor into his remarks. By the end of the discussion Litvinov had noticeably thawed. Roosevelt suggested that he and the Commissar meet again in the evening alone and continue their conversation in private, where they could, if need be, insult each other with impunity. Litvinov laughed heartily. The Roosevelt touch had succeeded, and the prospects for continued and profitable negotiations were greatly enhanced.⁸

It was at the night session that the question of propaganda as well as other stumbling blocks to agreement were successfully resolved.⁹ Unfortunately, the President, to the distress of historians, seldom made memoranda of his conversations and, therefore, no record exists of the meeting. However, the fact that only minor textual changes were made in the non-interference pledge in order to satisfy the Commissar indicates the degree of Roosevelt's persuasiveness and, also, serves to support the explanation for Litvinov's previous obduracy advanced by Phillips and Hull.

Further details were worked out between the Commissar, the President, and the Department drafters in the following days. By the night of the 16th, the various agreements had been put into final form and approval had presumably been received from Moscow to proceed with the signing. The ceremony took place in the early hours of November 17, in the President's study. Visibly pleased with the night's work, the President asked all those present to join with him in a toast to the new relationship—drunk in newly legal 3.2 beer.¹⁰

II

Recognition and the mutual commitments which accompanied it were embodied in an exchange of eleven letters and one memoran-

⁸Phillips Interview.

⁹Memorandum and enclosed drafts from Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser, the Department of State, to Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 11, 1933, Roosevelt Papers, The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. See also Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

¹⁰Phillips Interview.

dum, wherein the Soviet envoy agreed to certain undertakings on behalf of his government, most of which were reciprocated by the Chief Executive for the United States. The second letter included, in four articles, the exceptionally detailed pledges by Russia to refrain from participation in or encouragement of any propaganda or subversive activity which would affect the United States.

Article One recognized the unqualified jurisdiction of the United States within its own territory, and guaranteed the non-interference of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of America. Article Two pledged the Soviet Union to prohibit any subversive activity by the agents of its government, or by individuals or organizations directly or indirectly under its control or receiving any financial aid from it, which aimed at disturbing the tranquillity of the United States. Article Three consisted of a guarantee by the Moscow government not to permit the residence on its territory of any organization claiming to be the government of the United States or of any military group planning an armed invasion of the United States.

Undoubtedly, Article Four contained the most significant pledge. "Not to permit the formation or residence on its [USSR] territory of any organization or group—and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives or officials of any organization or group—which has as an aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in, the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions."

There was no question that Article Four applied directly and unequivocally to the Third International, the headquarters of which were located in Moscow, and to its operations in the United States through the American Communist Party. Although the phraseology was copied from sections of other treaties made by Russia, in its entirety it was a more sweeping obligation than any the Soviet Union had previously signed. It was notable that the wording made the Soviet government responsible for subversive acts by private as well as public and semi-public organizations and individuals.

It is tempting to speculate on the degree of American faith in the strict observance of these articles. Pledges similar in spirit if not as all-embracing and detailed in wording had been extended to other governments by Moscow and their violation had led to strained and even ruptured relations. As a matter of fact, it appears there was considerable skepticism among many of the negotiators as to the exact fulfillment of the pledges. It is probable that the President

and Mr. Bullitt were more hopeful than their associates that the commitments would be carried out.¹¹ In any case, all the American officials were convinced of the necessity for their inclusion in the correspondence in order to obtain a favorable public reaction to recognition. It was a *sine qua non* for American acceptance of a reconciliation with Russia.

On the Soviet side, the fact that Litvinov agreed to sign the pledges emphasized the importance Moscow attached to recognition by the United States. And there is considerable evidence to indicate that the Soviet government regarded these commitments as unusually broad concessions. It is possible also that they expected violations to occur and did not wish the Russian public to be aware of the exact wording of the texts. Whatever the motivation, so far as it is known, none of the letters containing the mutual undertakings were ever published in Russia. The extensive coverage of the recognition in Soviet newspapers did not include the commitments. Vague references were made to the letters, but, as described, they took on a thoroughly unofficial character. They did not appear in the official treaty collection nor in *Sovetsko-amerikanskie ot-nosheniia*, which was printed soon after the recognition and presumably included all documents of any importance in the relations between the two countries since 1917.¹²

As far as the Soviet reader knew, the exchange had consisted only of the first two letters, those in which the President had granted recognition, and Litvinov had accepted and reciprocated it. Russians undoubtedly gained the impression that the usual assurances of non-interference had been given in an informal manner, but they were given no hint as to the extensive coverage of the pledges. In fact, in the several reports given by V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and by Litvinov himself to the Party and State organizations during the next year and a half, repeated assurances were given that the government had made no concessions which were not in accordance with fundamental Soviet policy. But significantly, neither official enlightened his audiences as to the precise nature of the agreements concluded.¹³ The one

¹¹*Ibid.*; and Kelley Interview.

¹²*Sbornik deistvuiushchikh dogororov, soglashenii i konventsii, zakliuchennykh s inostrannymi gosudarstvami*, V. 8, Moscow, 1935; and *Sovetsko-amerikanskie ot-nosheniia*, Moscow, 1934, give only the first two letters.

¹³*Izvestia*, December 29, 1933; V.M. Molotov, *Stat'i i rechi*, Moscow, 1937, pp. 16-17. In his report to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on December

reference in the Soviet press, at the time of recognition, to the mutual obligations signed by Roosevelt and Litvinov was in a reprint of sections of the Commissar's address to the National Press Club in Washington on the night of November 17, 1933. The phrasing of Litvinov's remarks on that occasion indicated that he was thinking as much of his Russian audience as of his American listeners.

After noting that in response to the President's interest in the legal position and religious rights of Americans in Russia, he had written him a letter "supplying this information," the Commissar continued: "In addition—there was the inevitable question of propaganda. In another letter I assured the President that the relations of the Soviet government with the governments of other countries were based on the principle of mutual non-interference in internal affairs. I stated the mutual obligations undertaken by the Soviet government and other governments with which normal relationships were established. These obligations were extended to the United States."¹⁴

This extremely innocent description in no way conveyed a correct conception of the binding nature of the undertakings. Litvinov's clever wording may not have been noticed by his immediate audience, for they had seen the publicized documents and knew to what he was referring, but the Soviet reader received a most deceiving impression. All the above facts suggest that the Soviet government wanted a rapprochement with the United States badly enough to make commitments which, because of their variance with Communist theory and practice, it preferred not to broadcast in its own territory.

Before leaving the United States, Litvinov made two remarks which served notice of Moscow's interpretation of the propaganda guarantee. After his address at the Press Club, the Commissar was asked what effect the much discussed Article Four would have upon the American Communist Party. His answer was illuminating: "The

29, 1933, Litvinov declared that "at the national or governmental level contradictions between her [America] and our Union are absent, and troublesome questions were easily resolved." Maxim Litvinov, *Vneshniaia politika SSSR*, Moscow, 1935, pp. 61-62. Inasmuch as he was referring to the agreements as a whole, his phrasing was of particular interest because, without describing the contents of the letters exchanged between himself and Roosevelt, the Commissar was consciously or unconsciously serving notice that Russia would limit the application of the non-interference pledge to the governmental structure.

¹⁴*Izvestia*, November 20, 1933.

Communist Party of America is not concerned with the Communist Party of Russia and the Communist Party of Russia is not concerned with the Communist Party of America."¹⁵ Three days later he expressed the same idea more bluntly, when he admonished newsmen that: "The Third International is not mentioned in the document. You must not read into it more than was mentioned."¹⁶

Still another disquieting note concerning the agreement was sounded in the editorial pages of the New York Communist *Daily Worker*. Defiantly, the Party organ proclaimed that: "In this country the Communist Party, section of the Communist International, basing itself on the principles of Lenin and Stalin, will more than ever strive to win the American workers for the revolutionary way out of the crises, for the emulation of the Soviet Union and its revolutionary victories." In the same vein, a second editorial continued: "The capitalist press knows it, Roosevelt knows it, and the capitalist class knows it. . . . They know that every attempt to claim that Article Four of the Litvinov pact applies to the Communist International will meet with defeat. . . . The Communist International will grow in power and force."¹⁷

But from Moscow, the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador, Alexander Troyanovsky, evading the full implication of the agreement, assured his America hosts that: "Of course, no propaganda of any sort will emanate from the Soviet Embassy."¹⁸ The State Department, perhaps with inner doubts, assured the public that the President had secured effective guarantees against the Communist evils that many Americans feared would penetrate their country via the re-opened diplomatic channels.¹⁹

¹⁵*New York Times*, November 18, 1933.

¹⁶*Daily Worker*, November 21, 1933. The ex-American Communist Benjamin Gitlow relates that the American Communist Party was genuinely concerned about the effect of the subversive activities pledge upon their organization. According to Gitlow, the OGPU apparatus in the United States arranged a meeting between Litvinov and the Party Secretariat in New York, at which the Commissar assured the members that the commitments in no way affected the activities of their Party or its relations with the International. Benjamin Gitlow, *The Whole of Their Lives*, New York, 1948, pp. 264-265. It seems very surprising that Litvinov would risk such a meeting.

¹⁷*Daily Worker*, November 20, 21, 1933.

¹⁸*New York Times*, November 22, 1933.

¹⁹In a radio address on November 22, 1933, Assistant Secretary of State R. Walton Moore assured "all of our people who have felt concerned as to what might happen" as a result of renewed relations with Russia that it had been the "President's resolute purpose to safeguard the integrity of our Government and the rights of our

III

But words had to be matched with deeds. Time and temptation soon brought disillusionment and bitterness to the new relationship. Within less than two years the Soviets had shown their true colors. This is not the place to delineate the series of events in other fields which led to recriminations and blasted hopes for cooperation. The debt negotiations, continued after the Washington conferences, collapsed in January, 1935; the expected trade boom did not materialize; and diplomatic collaboration in the Far East, which had been the sought-after fruit of recognition by Moscow, was spurned by the United States, still unready to abandon her position of insularity. The last major blow in the unhappy aftermath of reconciliation came in the summer of 1935—a blow which in many ways struck deeper at the roots of the new friendship than those that preceded it.

In July, 1935, the long-delayed Seventh Congress of the Third International convened in Moscow. The meeting date had originally been set for the autumn of 1934 by a resolution of the XIII Plenum of the Comintern, which met in December, 1933. But in September, 1934, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee announced a postponement until the spring of 1935.²⁰ Apparently the date was again advanced before the Congress actually convened. It was not difficult to guess the reasons for the repeated delays. If the Congress had met when originally planned, relations with the United States would have been put to the test far too soon after the pledges of Washington. By the summer of 1935, however, Moscow could no doubt reason that the post-recognition failures at profitable cooperation with America left Russia with little to lose by one more antagonistic gesture. Moreover, the Soviet Union had made new and more advantageous friends since 1933.

But it would be incorrect to exaggerate the influence of Soviet American relations on the choice of a date for the Congress. Other factors were undoubtedly more decisive. In 1934, Russia faced many uncertainties, both international and domestic. The rap-

nationals." "That," he said, "was the primary purpose to which any strictly material question such as the settlement of debts was altogether ancillary." Robert Walton Moore, *Recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Washington, D. C., 1934, pp. 4-5.

²⁰XIII plenum IKKI, stenograficheskii otchet, Moscow, 1934, p. 597. Hereafter cited as XIII plenum. See also *Communist International*, v. 12, January 5, 1935, p. 37.

procurement with France was only in the formative stage and the policy of Russia toward the Nazi régime in Germany was undetermined. Stalin was still concerned with consolidating his power within the Soviet Union and in the Comintern. By July, 1935, Russia and France had signed their mutual assistance treaty, which was a part of the Soviet decision to take a clear stand against Hitler. And Stalin, secure in his leadership, could call a Congress with absolute assurance that it would docilely follow his orders.

Nevertheless, the effect of the Comintern meeting on Soviet-American relations was profound, for in attendance at the Moscow Congress were the representatives of the American Communist Party, who duly reported on the progress of the revolutionary movement under their leadership in the United States.²¹ Washington justifiably considered the incident a direct violation of the non-interference pledge made at the time of recognition and, accordingly, dispatched a protest to the Soviet government worded in the plainest language. Warning Russia that the "most serious consequences" would result if Moscow were "unwilling or unable . . . to prevent further acts in disregard of the solemn pledge given by it to the Government of the United States," the note stated frankly that the continuation of such activities would "preclude the further development of friendly relations" with America.

The Soviet reply, handed to Ambassador Bullitt by Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs N. Krestinsky on August 27, 1935, was a sweeping denial of the Washington charges. Asserting that all the commitments made to the United States had been scrupulously observed, Krestinsky declared that the Soviet government "cannot take upon itself and has not taken upon itself obligations of any kind with regard to the Communist International."²²

Later, Secretary Hull wrote that he had been astounded by the Soviet answer, which so blatantly disregarded the undoubtedly meaning of the pledge. Certainly, the response of the United States Government to Moscow's disavowal was extremely forthright. In a statement issued to the American press, Hull reviewed the recognition negotiations and the attendant commitments, declaring that Article Four of the non-interference guarantee "irrefutably" applied to the Third International. The answer of the Soviet government,

²¹Reports were made by Gil Green and Earl Browder. *VII Congress of the Communist International, Abridged Stenographic Report of the Proceedings*, Moscow, 1939, pp. 83-88, 245-248. Hereafter cited as *VII Congress*.

²²*Department of State Press Releases*, V. 13, July-December, 1935, pp. 147-152.

therefore, clearly constituted a repudiation of the pledge. If Moscow continued to ignore the clear stipulations of the commitment, Hull warned, "the friendly and official relations between the two countries cannot but be seriously impaired." The future of Russian-American friendship, he concluded "will depend upon the attitude and action of the Soviet government."²³

Ambassador Bullitt in Moscow was equally if not more disturbed by the Russian reply. Throwing aside the amenities of diplomacy, Bullitt called in American and other foreign correspondents at the Soviet capital and urged them to give prominence in their dispatches to the unparalleled treachery of the Russian government.²⁴ It is probable that the disillusionment of the Ambassador had its roots in the increasingly unsatisfactory results of the recognition he had so enthusiastically promoted. But the Comintern affair proved to be the turning point in his attitude toward the Soviets. From that time on his remarks left no doubt as to his hostility to the Moscow régime.

As had been the case at the time of the debt negotiation failure, Moscow made an effort to minimize the tension which grew out of the American protest over the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. The Soviet press refrained from any editorial comment on the incident. The newspapers published only a brief communiqué on the exchange of notes between Bullitt and Krestinsky, and an equally brief report on the public statement of Secretary Hull.²⁵ It would scarcely have been to the best interests of Russia to have allowed the affair to precipitate a withdrawal of American recognition at a time when Moscow was pursuing a policy designed to improve its relations with the capitalist world—a policy based on an apparent renunciation of the revolutionary aspects of the Soviet régime. Consequently, there was no attempt to inflame the public against the United States. Rather, an atmosphere of regret that America had taken the unhappy step of protesting permeated the brief coverage. It should be remembered, too, that the Russian people were still quite unaware of the exact nature of the pledges Litvinov had made in Washington.

In an effort to offset the accusations of Washington, Soviet officials asserted that counter-charges could have been made with justification by Moscow. Ambassador Troyanovsky, referring to the

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 151-152.

²⁴Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics, An Autobiography*, New York, 1941, pp. 306-308.

²⁵See *Izvestia* and *Pravda*, August 28, September 3, 1935.

various anti-Bolshevik Russian groups with headquarters in the United States, suggested that America look to the beam in her own eye.²⁶ In March, 1936, Joseph Stalin made the same comment in reply to a direct question from Mr. Roy Howard, who had asked why Litvinov signed the commitment if it were impossible for the Russian government to observe it.²⁷ Still another approach, used by the Soviet envoy, was to disagree disarmingly with the Comintern statements and theses in private conversation with American officials in Washington.²⁸

But the most interesting defense was the time-tested insistence upon the non-connection between the Soviet government and the Comintern—an argument obviously unsupported by the terms of the Washington agreement. In answer to the pointed questioning of Mr. Howard, Stalin declared that: "Litvinov signed his letter to President Roosevelt, not in a private capacity but in the capacity of a representative of a state, just as President Roosevelt did. Their agreement is an agreement between two states. In signing that agreement both Litvinov and Roosevelt . . . had in mind the activities of the agents of their states who must not and will not interfere in the internal affairs of the other side. . . . The Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement, as an agreement between the representatives of two states, should be interpreted within these limits."²⁹

IV

There can be no question that the proceedings of the Seventh Congress were a clear violation of the guarantees made at Washington, and that the United States had every right to submit a strong protest to the Soviet Union. But the publicized anger of American officials was more the measure of exhausted patience than of surprise and shock. The activities of the American Communist Party as a section of the International had been neither discontinued nor pursued in secrecy between the time of recognition and August, 1935. Delegates from the American Party had attended a meeting of the Plenum of the Comintern in Moscow within a month of the Roosevelt-Litvinov exchange. At that meeting, Earl Browder, the Secretary-General of the American Communist Party, had reported

²⁶*New York Times*, August 27, 1935.

²⁷*The Stalin-Howard Interview*, Recorded by K. Umansky, New York, 1936, pp. 7-8.

²⁸*Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 260-262.

²⁹*The Stalin-Howard Interview, loc. cit.*

on the activities of his section and American affairs had been discussed.³⁰ In the following months, articles by Communist leaders in the United States continued to appear in the official Communist publications. Oral protests to both Litvinov and Troyanovsky concerning these breaches of the pledge had brought no more satisfactory reply than a shrug of the shoulders.³¹

When Ambassador Bullitt warned Litvinov, in October, 1934, that the announced Comintern Congress would lead to "the most serious consequences" if American issues were discussed, the Commissar affected ignorance of the projected gathering. When Bullitt pressed the point, Litvinov angrily replied that "no nation ever starts talking about the activities of the Comintern unless it wishes to have as bad relations as possible with us." Although Secretary Hull rejected Bullitt's suggestion that Russia be warned of a possible break in diplomatic relations if the Third International should "get out of hand," he authorized the Ambassador to give notice that a definite lessening of the good feeling between the two countries could be expected in the event of such a development.³²

As the meeting date for the much postponed Congress approached in the early summer of 1935, Bullitt's intimations of American displeasure were repeated, and the Commissar's facetiousness changed to anger. In July, Litvinov first replied to the insistent request of the Ambassador for information with the comment: "Is there to be one [a meeting]? You know more about the Third International than I do. The other day when I was talking to Stalin I said that I had heard there was to be a meeting of the Third International on the 10th of this month. Stalin replied, 'Is there?' He knew no more about it than I do." But when Bullitt expressed doubts as to the sincerity of Litvinov's remarks, the Commissar took another tack. "I remember," he retorted, "I said [in Washington] I could not promise anything about the Third International." Forced into a tacit admission of knowledge, Litvinov thus put forward the defense which the Soviet government had always advanced in the past and which, lacking a better one, it would use in the coming unpleasantness with the United States, however inapplicable it might be.

³⁰Despite the recent Soviet-American reconciliation, the Roosevelt Administration was characterized by the Plenum as a war-seeking, semi-Fascist régime. *XIII plenum*, 105-106.

³¹*Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 111, 131, 156-157.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 156-157. The factual material following is taken from the same volume, pp. 221ff.

During the Congress, Bullitt was instructed by the Department to take careful note of the proceedings for the purpose of informing the Secretary of its activities and recommending appropriate action by the United States Government. His report indicated clearly that both the letter and the spirit of the non-interference guarantee had been violated. But his anger at Soviet audacity was tempered by his concern over the international situation. Although he suggested steps in some respects more drastic than those eventually taken, namely, a presidential message to the American people detailing the Soviet sins and cautioning vigilance against Communist machinations, he advised against severing diplomatic ties. Admitting that the United States would be "juridically and morally" justified in ending the twenty-two month relationship, he at the same time observed that no American interest would be served by a rupture which would leave Washington without any avenue for the transmission of information on Russia.

Nor did the Ambassador recommend a written protest, suggesting instead oral representations to Litvinov and Troyanovsky accompanied by restrictions on Soviet travel in the United States and the closing of Russian consular offices. This advice as well as the proposal for a presidential indictment was not followed by Roosevelt and Hull, the President preferring to dispatch a note and to hold in reserve for possible future violations the more drastic actions—an indication of the extent to which his illusions of fruitful cooperation with the Soviets had faded. Nevertheless, according to the diplomatic practice of the period, the protest and press release of the Secretary constituted a severe reprimand to Moscow.

From the vantage point of time and historical perspective, it would seem clear that, in making the agreements at Washington, the United States Government neglected to face the lessons of other negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Americans had little if any basis for believing that Russia would abandon the Comintern or discontinue its contacts with the American Communist Party. If a detailed non-interference pledge was the price of public approval for the re-establishment of relations, then the United States should have resigned itself to the acceptance of partial observance by Russia, or it should have been prepared to withdraw recognition if the guarantee was violated. Practical politics demanded a realistic approach to the unique Soviet-Comintern relationship if the rapprochement with Moscow was to work.

Yet, notwithstanding the unhappy effect on the subsequent course

of Soviet-American relations of the pledge violations and other sources of friction, the present writer is of the opinion that recognition was both advisable and profitable. Naturally, the continuance of Communist activity was a source of irritation to America. But it is extremely questionable whether normal intercourse with the Soviet Union increased the strength of Communism in America. Diplomatic barriers have never had an appreciable influence upon the health of the national parties, especially when they are not outlawed by domestic legislation.

On the credit side of the recognition ledger must be placed the opening of official channels for the exchange of views between the two countries—an important consideration at a time when Moscow was playing an increasingly important rôle in a world careening toward war. In this respect the United States gained more from recognition than Russia, which had, previous to 1933, three unofficial agencies reporting on America—the Communist Party, Amtorg, and the Soviet Information Bureau in Washington. Criticism should be directed not at the act of recognition, but rather at the naïveté with which it was concluded, a naïveté that bred false confidence in Communist promises and a disenchantment that should have been anticipated.

From Pushkin's Poems

Translated from the Russian

BY BORIS BRASOL

MICKIEWICZ

He used to live midst us—
A nation alien to him; no anger
Had dwelt toward us in his exalted soul,
And we loved him. Pacific and serene,
He came to our meetings, and we shared
With him our thoughts, and lofty meditations,
And songs (he was inspired from above,
And from above he contemplated life).
And often did he speak of future eras,
When humankind, forgetting ancient feuds,
At last will merge in one great family.
And avidly we listened to the bard.
He left us for the West. With benedictions
We saw him off. But now our peaceful guest
Has turned into our bitter foe; in venom
His poetry is steeped to gratify
Unruly mobs. And sadly from afar
We hear the voice—that well-familiar voice—
Of the irated bard. Oh, God, bestow
Thy peace on his exasperated soul.

REMINISCENCE

Kogda dlia smertnogo umolnet shumnyi den' . . .

When slowly for the mortal dies the noisy day,
And on man's silenced habitation
The half-transparent shadows cast their mantle grey,
And sleep, toil's sweetest compensation,
Comes, then in gloomy silence I am doomed to drag
Long hours of weary, dreadful waking.
Like vicious serpents' stings, remorses tease and nag
My mind oppressed by thoughts heartbreaking,
By useless self-reproach, and shame, and burning pain—
The overflow of sad reflections—
Which tacitly, but cruelly, unroll the vain
And lengthy scroll of my deflections.
Then, with disgust reviewing my whole life,
I curse myself, and conscience-smitten,
I weep and I lament, unnerved by inner strife,
Yet leave intact the lines once written.

A BEAUTY

Vnei vsio garmonia, vsio divo . . .

She is all harmony, all wonder,
Beyond all earthly passions' trace,
And, bashful, she reposes yonder
In her divinely fashioned grace.
She looks around with placid pleasure;
She has no rivals she should fear;
Our belles must fade and disappear
Before her glare and radiant presence.
Wherever thou shouldst start in haste—
Though e'en to sate thy love's temptations;
Whatever longings, ill or chaste
Be hid in thy premeditations,—
But if thou shouldst her sight embrace,
Thou wilt incline in admiration,
With awe-revering exaltation
Before the sanctity of grace.

Peter Struve's Escape from Soviet Russia

BY ARKADY BORMAN

LATE in July, 1918, the underground anti-Soviet organization to which I belonged entrusted me with the task of smuggling Peter Struve out of the country. He was to establish contact with the Allies abroad.

Ever since the nineties of the last century, Pyotr Bernardovich Struve, professor of political economy and member of the Academy of Sciences, had been a prominent figure in Russian intellectual and political life, at first as a leading socialist, then as a liberal, and lastly as a moderate conservative.

His grandfather, a German, had come to Russia in the capacity of a learned astronomer. The second generation was already completely assimilated. The Struves had become a typical Russian-educated family, belonging to the upper stratum of the civil service. The father of Peter Struve had been Vice-Governor of a province.

After graduating from the University, young Struve became a fervent Marxist and, together with Lenin and Tugan-Baranovsky (later also professor of political economy), did much to introduce this doctrine to the Russian public. Alertness of mind and insatiable intellectual curiosity were his chief characteristics, and these traits probably contributed to his early estrangement from Marxism, whose first serious and scholarly critic in Russia he thereafter became. At the beginning of this century, he joined the liberals and for some years acted, on behalf of the liberal underground organization, as Editor-in-Chief of the review *Osvobozhdenye* (Liberation), published first in Germany, then in Paris, and smuggled illegally into Russia.

In 1905, a limited constitution was granted by the Tsar. Struve returned to Russia and embarked upon manifold academic and political activities. He was a member of the second Duma, edited several reviews, held a professorship, and soon became one of the ideological leaders of Russian liberalism.

After the Bolshevik seizure of power in November, 1917, Struve declared himself from the very first in favor of the armed struggle

against Soviet rule and maintained close contacts with the military and civilian leaders who were organizing White armies in the South and in various border districts of the country.

By the summer of 1918, many of Struve's personal and political friends had left the Soviet-dominated part of Russia. Some, however, were staying on to carry on their underground anti-Soviet activities. Nearly all of them were later arrested and executed. In July, Struve was still in Moscow. At first he lived there quite openly, but soon he got wind that the government was looking for him with intent to arrest and eventually shoot him. Lenin hated him as a renegade of Marxism and an enemy with leadership potential.

However, in that first year of Soviet rule, the secret police was still badly organized and inefficient. Struve spent about two months in the very center of Moscow in the attic of a small detached house. We used to call on him there without any special precautions. But he avoided going out himself. It would have been dangerous for him to show himself in the streets; his large red beard attracted attention and many people knew him by sight.

Early in August, 1918, Allied troops landed in Archangel and Murmansk, and the Soviet rulers, headed by Lenin, were sure that their fate was sealed. But, as they put it, they were determined "to slam the door with a bang" before disappearing from the scene. We soon became aware of the slamming. In Petrograd, in retaliation for the assassination of Commissar Uritzky by Kannegger, five hundred hostages were shot, among them four Grand Dukes. In Moscow and other cities many arrests were made and a number of people were shot. People much less prominent than Struve were compelled to go into hiding.

Our plan of escape was quite simple. We in Moscow had not the slightest doubt that the Allies would quickly move into the interior of Russia and that the end of the Soviets was in sight. After all, apart from the police and a few contingents of sailors, fitted at best for guerilla warfare, the Soviets had no armed forces at their disposal. The Red Army was still in its embryo state, and there was nothing to stop a regular army. We decided, therefore, to travel northward as far as possible and to wait in some remote village for the arrival of the British.

We obtained for Struve a false passport in the name of the merchant Nikolai Belitzay. I hardly recognized him when we met at the station. He had shaved off his magnificent beard with which we all had become so familiar, and instead of the stately patriarch there

stood before me a bewildered man with a beardless, almost chinless face. For his 49 years, Struve appeared prematurely old and feeble. He was gazing about like a lost soul until he saw me. Without greeting me, he followed me into the coach and took a seat beside me. We behaved like total strangers—the station was teeming with Soviet police checking "documents." All went smoothly. The train pulled out, and only then could we talk.

Our destination was Vologda, midway between Moscow and Archangel. Somewhere near Vologda we planned to find a place to wait for the British. Vologda was several hundred miles behind the front, and nobody there checked our papers.

We settled in an isolated village about forty miles from Vologda. Life there went on as if no Revolution had occurred. Nothing reminded one of the Soviet régime except the textile shortage, of which the peasants complained.

Our life was peaceful in that beautiful region of the Russian North. Endless woods all around. Gentle wooded hills fading away towards the horizon. White church towers gleaming here and there in the midst of fields. But under the outward calm the peasants were tense. They were eagerly waiting for those who might emerge at any time from the vast expanses of the North. Two former soldiers from among the village lads were secretly dispatched north to gather news. They were willing to tramp for hundreds of miles to reach the other side of the front.

Struve, as usual, was absorbed in intellectual and political matters. He was avidly reading Pushkin from cover to cover, arguing and discussing current affairs with any person he could trust. He did not believe that Soviet rule would last. Nobody admitted such a possibility! We found some congenial friends, people capable of thinking for themselves. From time to time, we had visitors from the cities—a lawyer, an engineer, a high-school teacher. They all agreed that the régime would be short-lived. Meanwhile, the news filtering down from the North was discouraging. The British did not move south, and the Soviet rulers were using the delay to hastily assemble some new military units and to dispatch them hurriedly north against the foe, whose forces were kept immobile near Archangel. The Soviet vanguard in that vicinity were the sailors, who resembled a band of brigands. Jackets loosely flung over their shoulders, caps adorned with red ribbons, cartridge belts across their chests, two pistols thrust into their belts—such was the appearance of these sans-culottists, chief defenders of the Soviets.

Fall was drawing near, and we were well aware that in winter everything would come to a complete standstill. I decided to leave Struve in that secure hiding-place and to make a reconnaissance trip to ascertain whether it were possible to get farther north. The closer I got to the front—or rather to the rear of the Soviet army—the stronger the Red terror made itself felt.

The Vologda region is strewn with ancient monasteries. In the fifteenth century, monks were here the pioneers of colonization. One of the largest, and in the past most influential, was the Kyrillo-Belosersky monastery, founded at the end of the fourteenth century. The town of Kyrillov, which later sprang up around it, had majestic white churches framed by green forests. The monastery itself was surrounded by a high white wall like an ancient fortress. Although the front was more than 500 miles off, some Soviet commissars asserted that the monks were in touch with the British; as a result the Father Superior and about ten monks were executed. I drove past the monastery a short time after this. The local peasants were still stunned by what had happened.

I discovered that the only way to get close to the front was by means of a lengthy detour east. I had to go back to fetch Struve, and we set out in the direction of the Urals where by then Kolchak had opened another front.

In Vologda I obtained documents certifying that I was ordered north to procure firewood for some Soviet institution and that Struve, alias Belitzay, was coming with me as my secretary. We had to travel north by way of Viatka to Kotlass, situated on a picturesque hill overlooking the northern Dvina. I felt most apprehensive about Viatka, since I knew that Red Guards in the rear of the Kolchak front were stringently checking all passengers. What worried me greatly was Struve's appearance. His attire could not fail to attract attention; under a Western European style overcoat he wore a leather jacket and rather unusual leather breeches. His luggage consisted of smart Western suitcases, while the other passengers had nothing but sacks and baskets. There could be no doubt that here was a "bourgeois." What made things worse was his utter inability to converse with the common people. I even had the idea of passing him off as a deaf-mute to avoid conversation with fellow passengers.

We reached Viatka at about nine in the evening. It was raining. At the station all papers were examined by armed men of brutal appearance. The town itself was more than a mile off. After eight

in the evening no one was allowed to leave the station without a special permit. The permits were issued in town and were, therefore, unavailable to passengers arriving on the evening train. Nor were the passengers permitted to spend the night in the station building, which was nightly cleared of all outsiders. The problem seemed insoluble, but a kind-hearted station official found a way out. The new arrivals were assigned a niche near a siding where they could stay until dawn under the open sky.

I mustered all my courage and approached the highest-ranking of the officers. I showed him the paper commissioning me to purvey fuel and confided to him that I had a considerable sum of government money with me. I declined all responsibility for the safety of the money if I were compelled to spend the night on the tracks. The upshot was that we two were the only passengers allowed to spend the night in the room of the station-guard on duty.

The route to Kotlass ran northward through dense woods. At almost every station a food-control detachment inspected the passengers' luggage; carrying provisions was forbidden. At Kotlass the inspection, carried out by Latvian Communists, was especially thorough. However, we passed without difficulty, since the permits to proceed were issued by a young Latvian girl who craved cigarettes—of which she had none while we had plenty.

We boarded a steamer to Ustiug-Veliki, a desolate ancient little town in the far North with wonderful churches that would have been the pride of any capital. With difficulty we found a room in a dirty inn. My tired companion took off his overcoat, and I discovered, to my horror, the name "Struve" embroidered in large yellow letters on the black lining. All the markings had been removed from his underwear, but this one had been overlooked. I felt a chill down my spine. I rushed to the door, locked it, and feverishly began to remove the yellow thread.

The next day it became clear that from Ustiug it would be impossible to approach closer to our goal. We betook ourselves to Solvychegodsk on the shores of the majestic Vychedga River, on the other side of Kotlass. This was another neglected ancient town with beautiful churches dating from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. On the way to that place, Red Army men checked our papers several times, but my fuel mission duly impressed them.

The northern Dvina offered the British a direct route from Archangel to Kotlass—a distance of over 300 miles. Besides a few units of sailors strong enough to terrorize the population but of

little military importance, the government had no defense force along the river. Nevertheless, the British had not moved as yet and it was unlikely that they would undertake anything now that it was late fall.

Thus, our original plan had failed, and we did not know what to do next. For the time being we rented a small room on the outskirts of the town, close to the woods, and decided to wait for the autumnal ice-drift on the river. My firewood mission provided a reasonable explanation for our stay in this place surrounded by woods. A week passed. It rained steadily, the wind howled plaintively outside our walls. Struve had an uncanny ability to ferret out books wherever he lived. He even found some in this hovel and, despite the bad light—there was no electricity and very little kerosene—we spent our evenings reading Victor Hugo in Russian. One night there was a loud knock at the door. A policeman entered and demanded to see our papers, then he ordered Struve to follow him to the police station. My glance fell on Struve's shaking hands, and I felt sure that he was going away forever.

My first impulse was to flee into the woods, without waiting for the outcome—to vanish into the dark, inhospitable night. But, being a woodsman myself, I knew only too well that the woods in late fall offer nothing but cold and hunger. I had no weapon (the discovery of a gun when searched meant immediate execution). And escaping into the woods, in search of the British zone 300 miles away, meant almost certain death. I resigned myself to waiting. Time moved slowly. But after an hour and a half Struve was brought back. Now it was my turn to be taken to the police station; but since Struve had managed to extricate himself, I felt confident that nothing would happen to me, after all, I was here on an official mission.

There was a nasty cold rain, and my guard grumbled about all that trouble in the middle of the night. I didn't feel like talking to him. At the police station I was questioned about myself (not about Struve). It turned out that they were looking for deserters from the army, and my Belitzay, of course, had to be ruled out on account of his age alone. I took the offensive and threatened to complain to the central authorities. The next day we boarded the train in Kotlass to return, by way of Viatka, to our old hiding-place near Vologda.

In the night I was awakened by a voice coming from the neighboring compartment, angrily protesting with a non-Russian accent: "I am commander of the Zirani front [the Soviet right flank]! I am

on my way to Moscow to report to Lenin himself! How dare you inspect my luggage?"

"Commander or no commander," another voice replied quietly, "we don't give a damn. We have our orders. The transport of provisions is forbidden. Here you've got two sacks of flour."

"I'll enter a complaint! Show me your warrant!" shouted the outraged Red commander in his high-pitched voice.

"You better shut up! Warrant, indeed! And if you don't stop making a fuss—why, there are woods all around, no one will ever know what happened to you, you may be a hundred times a commander!"

We two were alone in our compartment. The commander's flour was duly confiscated, and now they were coming in to search our luggage. But we had no provisions.

After several unsuccessful attempts to get through to the British in the North, I decided to leave my companion behind in our safe village and to try our luck in Petrograd. It was a desperate undertaking, since Petrograd was in the throes of the Red terror. But we had no choice. In Petrograd I quickly succeeded in organizing our escape across the Finnish border. What appeared insuperably difficult proved surprisingly easy.

In the course of one year my beloved Petrograd—where I grew up and went to school—became a dead city. It was a ghastly experience to wander through the familiar streets, to look at the well-known buildings, squares, monuments. Everything was in its place, the walls were intact, but all life had departed, or else was petrified with horror. People were walking in silence along the grey discolored walls, throwing furtive glances around. There was hardly any traffic; only the commissars' cars were rushing about at high speed through the empty streets. Many stores were boarded up. The population was starving, which did not stop the authorities from searching all new arrivals and taking away their food. They took a bottle of milk I brought with me.

Most people were staying home, quietly enduring cold and hunger. Many of my friends had left, others were no longer alive. But there were some who were still active in the underground. I met Pyotr Vassilyevich Gerasimov, former member of the Duma. He was full of enterprise, often changed his name, seldom spent two nights in the same place. It was his special task to help people escape across the Finnish border and to provide them with secret information from Red headquarters where he had his own confidence men. Gerasimov

immediately introduced me to a university student who had connections with the Finnish smugglers.

"How fortunate you are to be getting out," Gerasimov remarked.

"Why don't you come with us?"

"Impossible, I must stay here to the end. . . ."

And he did stay to the end. A year later, he was caught by the Cheka and was shot in one of its notorious cellars.

Struve arrived a few days before the date fixed for the flight. Gerasimov provided us with information to be transmitted to the other side of the border. He was convinced that British troops were stationed in Finland a few miles from the frontier and couldn't understand why they failed to advance.

The escape itself was comparatively easy. There were three of us, Struve, myself, and the student who had made the arrangements and who had no intention of returning. We carried no luggage. We travelled to the frontier by train, not on the main line to Byelostrov, but on a sideline built in wartime and leading up to the eastern section of the border. Forty minutes after our departure, at ten in the evening, we got off at the next to the last station, to avoid the frontier control. A sleigh was waiting for us. We had no choice now but to entrust our fate blindly to a total stranger, a smuggler.

We were taken to a cozy cabin where they treated us to rye pancakes, a luxury at that time. Our prospective guide charged a very moderate fee for the crossing, with the understanding, however, that he would take us only as far as the first Finnish watch-post and then would slip away, since the Finns let no one go back and he wished to return. He was a familiar type, a Finnish peasant from the outskirts of Petrograd who spoke Russian with an accent. He assured us that the walk would take no more than two hours. But this was not so. Whether he wanted to show us that the crossing was very dangerous, or the danger was real, he made us tramp through the woods for eight hours, often without a path in the deep snow. From time to time he ordered us to throw ourselves to the ground face down. He was convinced that we were smugglers like himself. At last, towards dawn, we saw a small guard-house.

"This is Finland," said our guide, "I am going back now."

"This may be a trap," flashed through my mind. But we had no choice. I left Struve and our companion behind a big pine-tree and cautiously walked towards the cabin, composing English sentences in my head. What if Cheka men lay in ambush there? My nerves were strained to the breaking point.

A soldier in a German uniform came out of the guard-house and asked me in German: "Who are you?"

So, our guide had not betrayed us! Instead of the British, whom we expected to find there, we were met by a unit of Finnish chasseurs formed in wartime by the Germans out of the Finnish volunteers who had not wanted to fight on the Russian side.

This was early in December, 1918. We reached White Finland four months after leaving Red Moscow.

A year and a half later, Struve followed the summons of General Wrangel, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian White Army in the Crimea, to become his Foreign Minister.

Book Reviews

BAUER, RAYMOND A. *The New Man in Soviet Psychology*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952. 229 pp. \$4.00.

The majority of American psychologists, excluded from first-hand knowledge of the work of their Soviet counterparts by the formidable barrier of language and by the dearth of translations of even major works, are forced to rely almost exclusively on abstracts and summary articles prepared by those few of their professional colleagues who have a working knowledge of both languages. In writing the present volume, Raymond Bauer joins the ranks of those who have conscientiously attempted to meet the responsibility implied by this condition. This book, however, is only "partially a history of the science of psychology in the Soviet Union." It is also, along with other lesser aims, "largely an analysis of changing conceptions of human nature under conditions of social change." These two aims logically, although not formally, divide the book into two parts. The latter problem is most explicitly considered in the first three chapters plus the last. The seven intervening chapters offer a chronological survey of Soviet psychology starting with the early 1920's and carried through, by means of a special addendum, to press time, February, 1952.

The three decades covered by the historical review have seen a truly remarkable shift in the central assumptions of Soviet psychology. From being the passive, irresponsible, determined product of his environment, man has currently

emerged as the active, responsible, purposeful creator of that environment. It is only in their common underlying optimism that these two views overlap. Both predict change in the direction of improvement, the former by freeing man from environmental handicaps, and the latter by enabling him to accept his personal responsibility for working toward a common goal.

This fundamental shift in the trend of Soviet thinking is of crucial importance today. Mr. Bauer performs a service by amply and explicitly underlining it. The level at which this discussion is set, however, is unlikely to satisfy either the non-psychologist, who may find it too demanding of technical background, or the professional psychologist, who will find it lacking in the kind of specific detail which might have made the generalizations more meaningful as well as provided the basis for a critical evaluation on the part of the reader.

The sections dealing with changing conceptions of man as a product of changing social conditions offer the thesis that, as Soviet leaders more and more found themselves the shapers of the environment in which their people lived, they found increasingly untenable a position which traced all the ills of their society to that environment. A change in emphasis, shifting responsibility to the individual, became imperative. This thesis is convincingly argued and documented; its significance is less clearly stated. One is never certain whether the author believes that, at any given moment, the officially

recognized "Psychology" in fact reflects the underlying assumptions about human nature prevailing in contemporary Soviet society, or whether current psychological theory simply represents current political expediency. In the latter case, vastly different views must be held by the leaders. The implications of the ultimate contradiction of establishing personal responsibility by decree are never faced.

No student of Soviet foreign policy, for example, accepts official pronouncements as a complete and definitive statement of that policy. Rather, he recognizes the need for a searching analysis in which official policy is constantly evaluated in the light of both overt and covert actions. The complex inter-play between changing social conditions and the psychological make-up of the Soviet people is not to be understood by any less penetrating study. Factors essential to an adequate analysis include at least the concrete actions of the leaders and the actual behavior of the people, as well as official decrees and the published writings of psychologists. By limiting himself almost exclusively to the latter two sources of evidence, the author necessarily restricts the range of his conclusions with respect to the larger problem.

WILLIAM H. ITTELSON
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Soviet Legal Philosophy. (V. I. Lenin, P. I. Stuchka, M. A. Reissner, E. B. Pashukanis, etc.) Introduction by John N. Hazard. Translated by H. Babb. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951. 465 pp. \$7.50.

Under the title "Philosophy of Law" one can expect to find an

answer to all significant legal problems. Not so long ago the patriarch of American jurisprudence, Professor Roscoe Pound, discussed in his article "Philosophy of Law and Comparative Jurisprudence" (*University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, October, 1951) the problems of contract, tort, property, and at the same time of the limited possibility of an effective social control through law. The above-mentioned problems are not discussed in *Soviet Legal Philosophy*. The great political thinkers and philosophers, Hobbes, Locke, Hugo Grotius, Kant, Hegel, Bentham, and others, had discussed law as a phenomenon of social culture and a factor of social life in connection with ethical principles and human psychology. Engels and Marx have also offered their general philosophy of law founded on economic and sociological premises.

In the Soviet Union, where Marxist ideology has no competitors, philosophy of state and law is simplified to the utmost. According to the widely-known Marxist interpretation, emphasized by Lenin, the state is an organ for the rule of a certain class, whose interests cannot be reconciled with those of opposing classes. It is an instrument for the exploitation of oppressed classes. Bourgeois society supports its class domination by its system of criminal law and thereby holds the exploited classes in obedience. After the socialist revolution, the overwhelming majority of the population, consisting of the formerly oppressed classes of workers and peasants, ascends to the apex of the social pyramid, and then the law becomes an instrument for the struggle of these classes against the enemies of the working people, the remnants

of the bourgeois class and agents of the capitalist countries.

In conformity with Lenin's doctrine of the withering away of the state and law, the first Soviet constitution (1918) promised the abolition of state authority. Lenin's doctrine dominated Soviet jurisprudence until the thirties. The proletarian state was considered as a temporary instrument of oppression, necessary only for the period of organization of a socialist economy and the creation of a classless society. Krylenko, who had been Prosecutor and thereafter People's Commissar of Justice, denied the necessity for a Criminal Code in the future, and offered to leave a free choice of social defense measures to the O.G.P.U. Goichbarg, author of the Family Code, asserted that there is no need for the state to interfere in marital affairs, and predicted that the family as a juridical entity would disappear. Pashukanis explained the appearance of the Civil Code in the socialist state as a temporary concession to private trade; likewise, the temporary reestablishment of the commodity exchange and a monetary system. Consequently, he predicted that the Civil Code would be replaced with regulations of a purely technical character as soon as a socialist economy could be realized.

However, neither state nor law disappeared in the Soviet Union. The book under review shows, as the publisher's note explains, "how Soviet leadership has dealt with the problem of developing a theory of law which would take account of the practical needs of the Russian Revolution." No wonder that the book consists especially of "an extensive selection of material concerning the

problems . . . of the 'withering away of the state.'"

Thus, the content of *Soviet Legal Philosophy* is limited. If somebody expects to find in this book the Soviet interpretation of democracy, personal property, labor law, crime and punishment, etc., he will be disappointed. If he is interested in ethical problems and wants to know how Soviet jurists explain the correlation between law and morality or individual and collective interests, he will not find an answer. Nevertheless, if one is not familiar with the evolution of the Soviet theory of law and state and its adjustment to practical needs, the symposium published by the Harvard University Press will provide interesting and informative material. Since 1936, Stalin, Vyshinsky, and Yudin have attacked severely those who supported the idea of the withering away of state and law and characterized them as "enemies of the people" and "wreckers" (*vrediteli*). Stalin gave the directive according to which "the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat" is absolutely necessary for the successful accomplishment of the socialist revolution. Vyshinsky developed this point and later Golunsky, Strogovich, and Trainin elaborated a theoretical explanation of the significance of the "legal superstructure."

Undoubtedly, a new contribution to the study of Soviet legal philosophy is a valuable addition to what exists already in English. The works and ideas of Lenin, Stalin, and Vyshinsky are known, but those of Reisner, Pashukanis, Golunsky, or Trainin are less familiar. The Introduction by Professor J. N. Hazard contains biographical data concerning the Soviet jurists whose

works are included in the symposium. The translation is excellent. It would seem, however, that the choice of materials for the book in review was more or less accidental. Many readers would have preferred to know how Soviet jurists interpret democracy, crime and punishment, etc., instead of reading the detailed material on the rejected, and certainly erroneous, doctrine of the withering away of state and law.

GEORGE C. GUINS

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CONDODIE, MIKHAIL V. *The Soviet Financial System: Its Development and Relations with the Western World*. Columbus, Ohio, Ohio State University, 1951. 230 pp. \$4.00.

This study contains a good description, with some analysis, of the operations and significance of the Soviet financial system and its place in the collectivistic economy of the Soviet Union. In so far as possible, Soviet publications are used as the basic source of information, but since Soviet authorities have to a large extent placed an iron curtain around economic data, Professor Condoide, like all other writers on the Soviet economy, has also been forced to rely in many places on secondary sources of information.

The study has chapters on The Soviet Economic Organization; The Soviet Banking and Credit System; Soviet Money; The National Budget; Soviet Financial Relations with the World and Foreign Trade; Soviet Foreign Economic Policies, 1941-1950; Summary and Conclusions. The valuable appendix contains the texts of the following important documents: the Decree of

1950 changing the value of the ruble in terms of foreign currencies; the Decree of 1947 revaluing the ruble internally and ending rationing; extracts from the Potsdam Agreement affecting reparations; and the statement of the United States Department of State dealing with Soviet violation of treaty obligations. There is also an excellent bibliography of books and articles dealing with the Soviet economy.

Professor Condoide's major emphasis is on the functions of money and credit in the Soviet planned economy. Since Soviet banking, credit, and monetary policies are used to provide practically unlimited funds to promote industrialization, the spending program is more important than planning in the industrialization that has brought about full employment. Mobilization of all financial resources has made it possible for the state to direct the productive factors in the desired direction. The study also shows clearly how the Soviet state monopoly of foreign trade has been used as an instrument of imperialism in subjugating the satellite countries.

EARL R. SIKES

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HARCAVE, SIDNEY. *Russia: A History*. Chicago, Lippincott Company, 1952. 665 pp. \$7.50. (text \$6.00).

In the newest attempt to fill the need for a single-volume history of Russia suitable for college classes, Harcave wisely avoids writing in "an undeviating date-after-date manner" without permitting topical treatment to obscure the development of his subject by periods. He

has included at the beginning of each of his five parts a convenient list of dates, many good maps and illustrations of people and places, a short bibliography, and an index which includes the dates for each person cited in the text.

The author has devoted much thought to organizing his complex material. The result is a fully intelligible, clearly written narrative. It seldom is very penetrating or thought-provoking; it does not allude to the great controversial problems of Russian history nor point out the areas in which more monographic work is necessary to ease the task of the textbook writer. However, the lecturer who is himself prepared to interpret Russian history will find this book excellent for providing his students with a clear and coherent exposition of the facts, accompanied by an effort to explain them.

Remarkably few factual errors appear. Seclusion of women was not practiced by the Mongols (p. 47); Ivan III rather than Ivan IV began the service nobility (p. 29); under Nicholas I the ruble was based on silver not gold (p. 297); Finland should not be shown as a Soviet satellite in Map 15.

Some judgments are questionable. One should not speak of the "rounding out" of Russian Cesaropapism by 1589, with a century of a strong Patriarchate still ahead. In view of the whole history of the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth centuries, it is puzzling to learn that the Russian nobility "never achieved comparable strength" to that of other countries.

The most important general criticism relates to the treatment of the problems of Russian society, which for most of the twelve centuries

treated have been largely those of the peasantry. The objection is not based on grounds of the allotment of space, though the "rise of serfdom" might indeed be given more than the dynastic prelude to the Time of Troubles (pp. 31-3). In periods of peace, the author views the peasantry as a purely passive entity, an object rather than a subject as it seems to become only in sporadic violent uprisings (Razin and Pugachov are mentioned, though Bolotnikov and the peasant riots under Nicholas I are not). For example, the origin of serfdom is said to be "connected with the fact that the landlord class had changed," and to be "part of the sweeping advance of autocratic rule"—in other words, serfdom is made simply a function of autocracy and nobility. The peasant colonization of Siberia is not discussed, and Asiatic Russia receives only the usual remarks on exploration and diplomacy. The whole process of growth of individualism in agriculture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is slurred over; even those unmistakable changes which "grew out" of Stolypin's reforms are pictured as something imposed from above against a dead weight of "custom and tradition" in the village.

All this prepares the author to fall prey to the Soviet account of agrarian change. The entire rôle of the SR's in 1917, based on the swelling peasant revolution, is slighted, though the "left SR's" even so receive too much emphasis. The Soviet tale of "class warfare" in the village in 1918 and in 1929-30 is repeated, though it ought now to be clear that this was chiefly warfare of the Bolsheviks *against* the village. The peasants, says Harcave, "had consistently resisted changes" in

technique and organization of community life; the long peasant struggle for land and liberty is somehow overlooked.

In order to write Russian history it is necessary to relate the peasant problem to other developments; likewise, to write Soviet history it is necessary to relate the Marxist ideology of the leaders to their actions. The author, although devoting too little space to Marxism, achieves the second objective better than the first. Despite all shortcomings, however, Harcave, by his cautious and painstaking approach, has produced an extremely useful and valuable textbook. It should be welcomed by all who have the task of leading students onto the unfamiliar ground of Russian history.

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SPEKKE, ARNOLDS. *History of Latvia, an Outline*. Stockholm, M. Goppers, 1951. 436 pp. \$8.70.

Until recently the reading public of the English-speaking nations—including that part of the public well-read in history—has remained in relative ignorance of the rich and absorbing history of the Eastern Baltic region. Few works in our language have made use of the great body of historical studies dealing with that area. Such works as have been consulted by our historians have usually been in the German or Scandinavian languages and have tended to reflect corresponding national bias. We have remained, for the most part, unaware of the high degree of competence developed by Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian historians and archae-

ologists, and of their impressive achievements in research. Gradually, in recent years, this blank spot in our knowledge is being contracted. An encouraging sign is the almost simultaneous appearance of the first two English-language histories of Latvia making any pretension to fullness: the volume under review and Alfred Bilmanis' *A History of Latvia* (Princeton University Press, 1951).

Of the two volumes, there can be little doubt that scholars will find the work of Dr. Spekke the more satisfactory. It is longer, more detailed, and more richly documented. It contains an abundance of maps, illustrations in the text, and plates—some of them reproductions of old sketches or prints—to illuminate almost all aspects of Latvian history and cultural development. It discusses fairly and fully the historiography of the region and the various schools of interpretation; it is temperate in its approach to most disputed problems. Its bibliography is much fuller and better balanced than that given by Bilmanis. Above all, there is a marked difference of atmosphere in the two volumes. Bilmanis was a Latvian nationalist before all else, and it is sometimes a question whether he was an historian or a right-wing politician. Dr. Spekke is a scholar; and, on the whole, he has enough confidence in his people not to weaken their case by overstatement. His political bias appears, to be sure, in the last chapters of his book; but it does not lead to such grave distortions as, in the opinion of this reviewer, mar the work of Bilmanis for the period since the First World War. Throughout the volume, but particularly in the long section dealing with the prehistoric period, Dr. Spekke presents

the evolution and vicissitudes of the Latvian people in their context of European, and especially East European, developments. The result is a clear picture, made sharper by the numerous excellent sketch-maps, of the relationship of Latvia to the history of the entire Northeast European area.

More than a quarter of the book is devoted to the period from the Ice Age to the coming of the Germans at the end of the twelfth century. This is probably the best part of the work, as well as the least familiar to the average American reader. Dr. Spekke's treatment of the later periods is characterized by the use of many materials hitherto little employed, particularly the accounts of Italian travelers, and by a remarkably successful attempt to rediscover the life and culture of the Latvian people during the long centuries when they were crushed under an alien structure of society and government. The slow development of a national consciousness and of a national literature, particularly during the nineteenth century, is interestingly traced. The confused struggle at the end of the First World War which resulted in the establishment of the Latvian Republic receives more lucid treatment at the hands of Dr. Spekke than in any other work this reviewer has seen. Suspicion will persist in the minds of some readers, however, that Stucka and the other ardent and numerous Latvian Bolsheviks—whose régime, after all, was overthrown not primarily by Latvian nationalists, but by a combination of Latvians, Estonians, Germans, and Western Allied forces—have never had their day in the court of Western history.

Dr. Spekke is discreet enough to

glide quickly over the right-wing dictatorship set up by Karlis Ulmanis in 1934, instead of extolling it as Bilmanis does. That our author, however, was a servant of that highly illiberal and undemocratic régime and that he spent the years after 1940 in Fascist Italy, where he wrote this book, are facts which must be taken into account in assessing the reliability of his interpretation of recent history. Whatever allowance must be made for his bias, and for the fact that since 1940 his information has been second-hand and colored by the emotions of hot and cold wars, his account of the war years is interesting, especially with respect to the formation of the Latvian Legion which fought on the side of the Germans.

Unfortunately, the merits of this volume are considerably impaired by a tendency towards diffuseness, a loose and sometimes rather confusing organization, and occasionally a rough or infelicitous translation—defects with which the Bilmanis volume cannot be charged. "Feuds" appears on p. 273, where "fiefs" is obviously meant; "calm and spiteful" (for "calm and defiant?") on Plate XXXV; "humanitarian education" (for "liberal education?") on p. 175.

A very few errors of fact occur. It was the New Testament, not the entire Bible, which appeared in Estonian translation in 1686 (p. 239). It is certainly inaccurate to say that "the period of florescence of the Hanseatic League . . . lasted from the 12th to the 14th century" (p. 156). The Bermondt-Avalov forces were not "headed by the German General von der Goltz" in November, 1919 (Plate XLIII). In general, however, the detailed scholarship is beyond reproach.

In the evaluation of such a full and wide-ranging work as this, it may seem carping to deplore the omission of certain subjects. This reviewer, however, believes that by cutting down the discussion of certain non-Latvian matters in some cases space could have been found for certain aspects of the country's history which our author has neglected. It is legitimate and natural for Dr. Spekke to be more interested in the Latvian people than in the German military men who conquered and oppressed them; nevertheless, the Sword Brethren and the Teutonic Knights did set up a state which dominated the region for over three centuries, and it is regrettable that no clear account of the origin, structure, and functioning of these military organizations is included. Some attention ought to have been paid, too, to the rise of the *Ritterschaften* and to the transformation of the Livonian Confederation into the *Landesstaat* of the Swedish and Russian periods. The commercial development of the Livonian cities and their internal political struggles in the Middle Ages and early modern times are slighted. The involvement of the Hanseatic League in the politics of the Eastern Baltic and the growing clash of interest between the League as a whole and the Livonian towns are not made clear. The connection between the growth of manorialism and the expanding foreign market for grain is not touched upon. It is a pity that Dr. Spekke's otherwise well-informed and illuminating attention to the general politics of Northeastern Europe does not extend to the mid-thirteenth century. He makes no reference to the papal grand strategy of a general offensive against schismatic Russia on the Finnish-Livonian

front, and only a bare mention of William of Modena, the apparent coördinator of that strategy and one of the most important political figures of the century in the history of Livonia as well as of Northern Europe generally. In this context the Battle of the Ice in 1242 and the career of Alexander Nevsky would assume far greater significance than is attributed to them in these pages. For the nineteenth century one might wish for some discussion of the 1840's and of the more radical manifestations of national unrest towards the end of the century, particularly the peasant hostility to the church system. Oddly enough, most of these points were neglected also by Bilmanis.

Evidently, then, even this admirable compendium and interpretation leaves room for research and publication in English in the field of Eastern Baltic history. It is to be hoped that such a stimulating and learned introduction as Dr. Spekke's will cause some of our younger scholars to turn their attention to this area, and to acquire the prerequisite linguistic competence.

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G. P. STRUVE (ed.). *Neizdanny Gumilyov*, New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1952. 240 pp. \$2.25.

One of the most tragic losses of the Russian Revolution was the death of one of the outstanding poets of our times, Nicholas Gumilyov, who was shot by the Bolsheviks in 1921. Since then, most of Gumilyov's published works have

been republished abroad, but they have been out of print for a long time and represent now a bibliographical rarity. Therefore, there is still a crying need for an edition of his collected works to be published this side of the iron curtain, since such an enterprise is unlikely to see the light of day in the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, Professor Gleb Struve of the University of California at Berkeley, himself a poet and a lifelong admirer of Gumilyov's poetry, has brought out a collection of Gumilyov's unpublished works which consist of a tragedy in five acts, "The Poisoned Tunic," written in blank verse partly with rhymes; twenty poems or variants which have not been published in any of Gumilyov's books and most of which are contained in an album in Gumilyov's handwriting in the possession of Professor Struve; and, finally, the beginning of a novel entitled "The Merry Brethren."

Undoubtedly "The Poisoned Tunic" is the most important item in this collection. It is a beautifully worded and moving tragedy taking place at the beginning of the sixth century in the reign of Justinian, Emperor of Byzantium. But it is not a historical drama as such. Outside of Justinian and his wife Theodora, the other characters are

fictitious and these are precisely the most important ones. The story is essentially that of a love conflict between Zoe, daughter of Justinian, and the warrior-king of Trapezond, on the one hand, and the Arab poet Imr, on the other. In the end the poet wins Zoe's love only to perish from the poisoned tunic sent him by Justinian, while the warrior-king immolates himself by plunging from the scaffolding of the cathedral of Saint Sophia, then under construction. This tragedy is not only a masterful example of Gumilyov's mature poetical work, but a valuable addition to modern Russian literature as well.

Professor Struve has performed a veritable feat of literary detection in establishing the text of this tragedy. He had in his possession a draft of the first four acts and the beginning of the fifth of the tragedy as well as a final copy of part of the first act, both in Gumilyov's handwriting. Later by painstaking research he discovered the existence of two copies of the work taken from a typescript smuggled out of the Soviet Union in 1931. Finally, he was able to obtain these two copies and to collate their text with the ones in his possession, thus establishing as definitive a text as seems possible.

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BOOK NOTICES

GURIAN, WALDEMAR. *Bolshevism, An Introduction to Soviet Communism.* Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1952. 180 pp. \$3.25.

The purpose of this book is "to reveal the basic factors, the 'essence'" of modern Communism. As so often happens in similar attempts, the "essence" somehow escapes, but in the process a number of interesting and stimulating essays are offered on Bolshevik doctrine, historical background, and Bolshevism as world power. The author, who is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame and a well-known specialist on Russian affairs, comes to the conclusion that containment of world Communism is likely to be achieved without an atomic war and, secondly, that Bolshevism presents a challenge to complacency about the existing order.

An extensive appendix offers well-chosen excerpts from Marxism-Leninism.

KAZEMZADEH, FIRUZ. *The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-1921).* New York, Philosophical Library, 1951. 345 pp. \$5.75.

The process of dispersal of the Russian Empire after the fall of the monarchy in 1917 and of subsequent reabsorption of the non-Russian borderlands into the Soviet Empire, received until recently little attention. The present volume is an important contribution to this field of study. It deals with the complex and confused struggle for Transcaucasia from 1917 to 1921. The story is that of the emergence of

three independent republics, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, their eventual dissolution and the establishment of Soviet power in the whole region. The volume is an outstanding piece of research, clear, well written and arranged, objective in its approach—and should be of great interest to historians and all students of Russian affairs.

As Professor Karpovich observes in the introduction to this work (which earned the author a Ph.D. from Harvard), "the story it tells points out the difficulties to be faced, and the pitfalls to be avoided, both by the local nationalities, in their efforts to arrange their mutual relations, and outside powers, in their attempts at influencing the outcome. This is a timely lesson, indeed."

LINDSTROM, THAIS S. *Tolstoi en France.* Paris, Institut d'Etudes Slaves de l'Université de Paris, 1952. 172 pp.

The author traces the literary reactions to Tolstoy in France, from de Vogüé's book on the Russian novel to Tolstoy's death (1886-1910). In addition, the reminiscences and observations of some seventeen French pilgrims, men of letters and journalists, to Yasnaya Polayna are surveyed. One chapter is devoted entirely to Tolstoy and Romain Rolland. Of special interest is the survey of the various reactions to Tolstoy's work of such literary figures as Zola, Léon Daudet, Henri Bordeaux, etc. This compact and well-written study should be of interest to all students of comparative literature.

MANNING, CLARENCE A. *The Siberian Fiasco*. New York, Library Publishers, 1952. 202 pp. \$3.75.

This is a summary account of counter-revolution and allied intervention in Siberia, 1918-1920. There is little in this book that is not already familiar to students of the subject. The author holds, as the title of the book indicates, that the allied intervention was a complete fiasco because it failed to help the local population to establish a democratic régime. How this was to be accomplished, precisely, under the conditions then existing, is not made clear. Apparently the author believes that the greatest mistake of the allies and especially of the U.S. State Department was their position that united Russia must be preserved at all costs, in other words that the allies should have been much more forceful in encouraging local separatism. This fact the author believes should be a lesson for the makers of our foreign policy today.

MASLENIKOV, OLEG. *The Frenzied Poets, Andrey Biely and the Russian Symbolists*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1952. 223 pp. \$3.75.

The Russian Symbolist Movement is one of the most productive and rich periods in Russian literature and culture. Very little has been written on the subject, and the present volume is a welcome contribution. The bulk of the book is devoted to Andrey Biely, 1880-1934, one of the central figures in the Russian Symbolist Movement. The author's aim is to "illuminate the essence" of the movement through a study of Biely's life. He traces the

origins and development of the Symbolist Movement (rather sketchily), surveys the childhood and background of Biely and, in perhaps the most interesting chapters of the book, shows Biely's relations with other symbolists—Brusov, the Merezhkovskys, Blok, and Viacheslav Ivanov. The volume, unfortunately, contains very little interpretation of Biely as a man of letters and of symbolism as a literary school. Nevertheless, there is much interesting and useful information, which may stimulate further studies of the subject.

MENSHUTKIN, BORIS N. *Russia's Lomonosov, Chemist, Courtier, Physicist, Poet*. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1952. 197 pp. \$4.00.

This is an authoritative biography of Lomonosov, the great eighteenth century Russian scientist, artist, and poet, by a Russian chemist and foremost authority on Lomonosov. This standard work on the subject is another volume in the series brought out by the Russian Translation Project of the American Council of Learned Societies. The book should be of interest to students of the history of science and of eighteenth century Russian culture.

NEW YORK GROUP OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. *Protiv Tchernia* (Against the Current). New York, Walden Press, 1952. 96 pp.

A series of political articles by a group of Russian Mensheviks (B. Sapir, G. Aronson, B. Dvinov, and others), directed against such emigré political groups as the Solidarists

and the Vlasovites. These groups are considered by the authors to be fundamentally undemocratic. For this reason the authors of the articles make it clear that they would be unwilling to enter a united democratic league for the struggle against Stalin's régime, unless and until such a league should purge itself of all undemocratic elements.

O'BRIEN, C. BICKFORD. *Russia Under Two Tsars, 1682-1689, The Regency of Sophia Alekseevna*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1952. 171 pp. \$2.50 (paper) \$3.50 (cloth).

This is a well-documented and well-written study of the much neglected regency of Sophia (1682-1689), the half-sister of Peter the Great. The author states in the introduction that the object of this study is to "eliminate some of the false notions about Sophia's régime and to show it for what it was—a government of unusual distinction and promise, which pursued with intelligence and imagination the interests of Russia abroad and introduced reforms at home that are usually believed to have originated in succeeding generations." On the whole, the author is quite successful in proving this thesis.

SCHUELLER, GEORGE K. *The Politburo*. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1951. 79 pp. \$1.25.

Mr. Schueller's study is a minor triumph of mind over matter. The triumph lies in the skill with which he has extracted the last drop of information from a painfully scanty amount of matter. The Politburo,

as Professor Harold Fisher drily observes in his introduction to the study, "has not cooperated in this laudable purpose of increasing our knowledge of its inner life." What Schueller dug out had to be dug out the hard way. He did an excellent job.

His conclusions may very briefly be summarized as follows. The Politburo is a self-perpetuating, completely unrepresentative body of efficient administrators whom Stalin can and apparently does trust. The evidence in support of these conclusions is laid out in full and interesting detail.

SCOTT, ANDREW M. *The Anatomy of Communism*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1951. 193 pp. \$3.00.

This brief exposition of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, written with the aim of throwing more light on modern Communist theory and practice, is a helpful guide to students of the subject. The author's approach to the system of thought he analyzes is critical, although he is not unfair in his exposition of the founders whose works are copiously quoted.

STRUVE, GLEB. *Soviet Russian Literature, 1917-1950*. Norman, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1951. 400 pp. \$5.00.

This book is the most comprehensive account of Soviet literature in English. It is based on a book first published in Great Britain in 1935, later revised and reissued in 1944, under the title of *Twenty-five Years of Soviet Russian Literature*. The present volume, containing

much new material, particularly dealing with the first decade of Soviet literature, brings the story up to the year 1950. The aim of the author, who is not a Marxist, is to be as objective as possible; also, as he points out in the introduction, he is not aiming to show "what liter-

ature in Soviet Russia was *unable* to accomplish *because* of being stifled and 'bureaucratized' (which it, no doubt, is), but rather what it *has* achieved *in spite of* all the efforts at bureaucratization." The volume contains a good bibliography and the printing is excellent.

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